Missouri Law Review
Volume 56
Issue 1 Winter 1991

Article 7

Winter 1991

Examining the Mystery behind the Unusually and Inexplicably
Broad Provisions of Section Seven of the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act: A Call for Clarification
Peter T. Wendel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter T. Wendel, Examining the Mystery behind the Unusually and Inexplicably Broad Provisions of Section
Seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act: A Call for Clarification, 56 MO. L. REV. (1991)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Wendel: Wendel: Examining the Mystery behind the Unusually and Inexplicably Broad

Examining the Mystery Behind the
Unusually and Inexplicably Broad
Provisions of Section Seven
of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act:
A Call For Clarification
ProfessorPeter T. Wender
I. INTRODUCTION

The sole trustee of a charitable foundation calls a not-for-profit
organization and proposes the following deal:' the foundation will make two
donations of $1,000,000 each to the organization if the organization will use
one of the donations to purchase a residence and deed it back to the
foundation as a gift to be used as the trustee's residence. The not-for-profit
organization will be free to keep the other $1,000,000 as a charitable donation
towards its operating costs. The not-for-profit organization relies heavily upon
private donations for its budget and therefore is extremely interested in the
proposal. The organization does not understand why the trustee does not buy
the residence directly, but the organization decides it is better not to ask and
risk jeopardizing the proposal. If the not-for-profit organization decides to go
through with the proposal, and the purchase of the residence turns out to
constitute an impermissible use of the charitable foundation's funds, is the
organization liable for participating in the trustee's breach of its fiduciary
duties to the foundation?2

Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law. B.A., 1979,
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1. This hypothetical is based loosely upon a newspaper article which appears at
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
2. For a general discussion of the liability of a third party for participating with
a trustee in a breach of trust, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283-326
(1959); G. BOGERT, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §§ 901-920 (2d rev. ed. 1982 &
Supp. 1988); IV A. ScoTT & W. FRATCHER, The Law of Trusts §§ 283-326 (4th ed.
1989).
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At common law, there is no doubt that the not-for-profit organization is
liable for participating in the breach of trust. At common law, a third party
dealing with a trustee has a duty to inquire into the trustee's powers; if the
party fails to inquire, the party is chargeable with knowledge of the information a diligent inquiry would reveal. 3 The not-for-profit organization knows
it is dealing with a trustee. The broad common law duty of inquiry charges
the organization with knowledge of information the organization would obtain
if it conducted a diligent inquiry into the trustee's powers. Assuming a
diligent inquiry reveals that the proposed transaction constitutes a breach of
trust, the organization is liable for participating.4
Similarly, under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, the not-for-profit organization also is liable for participating
in the breach of trust.5 Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act require that third parties dealing with a trustee act in good
faith. 6 The not-for-profit organization's suspicions about the proposal,
coupled with the organization's conscious decision not to ask any questions
in the hope of avoiding damaging information, constitute bad faith. 7 The not-

3. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS,

supra note 2, § 297 comments c-f; G.

supra note 2, § 894; A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 297.4.
4. In addition, to receive trust property free of the trust, at common law, (he third
party had to give valuable consideration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra
note 2, §§ 284, 298-309; G. BOGERT, supra note 2, §§ 881, 887; A. ScOTt & W.
BOGERT,

FRATCHER, supra note 2, §§ 284, 297A-309. Accordingly, even if the third party has
no notice that it is dealing with a trustee, if the third party is a donee, the third party
receives the trust property subject to the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,
supra note 2, § 289; G. BOGERT, supra note 2, § 868; A. SCOTr & W. FRATCHER,
supra note 2, § 289.
5. Assuming that the trustee made the donations by check, article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code would apply, as would section 5 of the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (1977); UNIF. FIDUCIARIES ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 140-41
(1990) [hereinafter U.F.A.].

6. The Uniform Commercial Code expressly requires that for a party to receive
the negotiable instrument free from all claims to it the party must be acting in good
faith. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305 (1977). The Uniform Fiduciaries Act implicitly
requires that the party be acting in good faith by imposing liability in the absence of

good faith. If the party "takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach
[that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary] or with
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to badfaith."
U.F.A. § 5, 7A U.L.A. 140-41 (1990); see also U.F.A. §§ 4, 6-9, 7A U.L.A. 139, 14452 (1990).
7. Riley v. First State Bank, Spearman, 469 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Ct. App.
1971); accord U.F.A. § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 130 (1990) (citing cases defining bad faith
as the antonym of good faith). See also Davis v. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives
and Granting Annuities, 337 Pa. 456, 460, 12 A.2d 66, 68 (1940).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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for-profit organization's bad faith would subject it to liability for participating
in the breach of trust. In addition, although both the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act reject the broad common law duty of
inquiry arising simply because one knows or should know it is dealing with
a trustee, both uniform laws retain a limited duty of inquiry if the third party
knows that the fiduciary will benefit personally from the transaction.8 The
not-for-profit organization knows that the trustee will benefit personally from
the proposal: the trustee intends to move into the residence. If the not-forprofit organization fails to inquire into the propriety of the proposal, and the
proposal in fact constitutes a breach of trust, the organization is liable for
participating in the breach of trust.9
Under the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, however, the not-for-profit
organization would not be liable for participating in the breach of trust.
Section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act provides unusually broad
protection to third parties dealing with a trustee. Section seven rejects both:

(1) the broad common law duty of inquiry, and (2) the good faith and limited
duty of inquiry standard prevailing in the other uniform laws addressing the
liability of a third party dealing with a fiduciary. Instead, section seven of the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act fully protects a third party dealing with a

trustee unless the third party has actual knowledge that the transaction
constitutes a breach of trust, and, further, the third party has absolutely no
duty of inquiry.'0
Accordingly, even though the organization strongly

suspects that there is something wrong with the proposal, and consciously
shields its eyes to avoid acquiring damaging information, the organization

does not have actual knowledge that the proposal constitutes a breach of trust.

8. Neither the U.C.C. nor the U.F.A. expressly retains any duty of inquiry, but
both uniform laws subject the party receiving the instrument to liability if the party has
knowledge that the transaction is for the benefit of the fiduciary. U.C.C. §§ 3-304(2),
3-302, 3-305 (1977); U.F.A. § 5, 7A U.L.A. 141 (1990). The effect of imposing
liability where the party has such knowledge is to impose upon such party a duty to
inquire into the propriety of the transaction if the party wants to take the property free
from all claims. See U.F.A. § 6, 7A U.L.A. 144-45 commissioner's note (1978).
9. In addition, the U.C.C. expressly requires that for a party to receive the
negotiable instrument free from all claims to it the party must give value. U.C.C. §§
3-302, 3-303, 3-305 (1977). The U.F.A. is silent with respect to whether the party
must give value, but the principal focus of the U.F.A. is "to establish uniform and
definite rules in place of the diverse and indefinite rules now prevailing as to
'constructive notice' of breaches of fiduciary obligations." 7A U.L.A. 128 commissioner's note (1978). The limited focus of the Act implicitly indicates that the Act
does not change the common law requirement that a third party has to give valuable
consideration to receive property free from all claims.
10. UNIFORM TRusTEs' POWERS Acr § 7, 7B U.L.A. 758 (1990) [hereinafter

U.T.P.A.].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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The not-for-profit organization knows that the trustee will benefit personally
from the proposal, and yet the organization has absolutely no duty to inquire
under any circumstances. Absent actual knowledge, the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act provides that the not-for-profit organization can go through with
the proposal with confidence that it has no liability exposure."
In light of the unusually broad protection accorded third parties dealing
with a trustee under section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, one
would expect to find a thorough and well reasoned explanation for section
seven's "actual knowledge with no duty of inquiry" standard. In fact,
however, the exact opposite is the case. The legislative history behind section
seven indicates that the Special Committee of the Uniform Law Commission
responsible for drafting section seven never realized that section seven rejected
the prevailing good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard. In fact, the
only comments attributable to the Committee indicate that the Committee
thought section seven retained the good faith and limited duty of inquiry
requirements. The Committee's mistake appears to arise from its blind
acceptance of the actual knowledge standard as rhetorically proposed by
Professor Fratcher in an historic article which called for and proposed the key
provisions of the uniform trustees' powers legislation.12 The unusually broad
provisions of section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act are not the
result of a well researched and reasoned decision by the Committee. The
unusually broad provisions are the result of blind acceptance of an inadequately researched and analyzed tentative proposal.
The conflict between the unusually broad provisions of section seven of
the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the legislative history behind section

11. Section 7 of the U.T.P.A. is also silent with respect to whether the third party
must give valuable consideration to receive the trust property free from all claims.
Unlike the U.F.A., however, the express language of § 7 implies that the traditional

requirement that the third party give valuable consideration is no longer necessary.
Section 7 expressly provides that a third party is "ftlly protected" unless the third party
has "actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising

them." U.T.P.A. § 7, 7B U.L.A. 758 (1990) (emphasis added). Unlike under the
common law, the U.C.C., and the U.F.A., the fact that the not-for-profit organization
is a donee appears to have no effect on its liability under the U.T.P.A.
12. Unlike the Uniform Law Commission's Special Committee, Professor Fratcher
no doubt realized that his actual knowledge proposal rejected the good faith and

limited duty of inquiry requirements. Moreover, a strong case can be made that
Professor Fratcher wanted to go further. He wanted complete immunity for third
parties dealing with a trustee, even when the third party had actual knowledge that the
transaction constituted a breach of trust. See infra note 94. It is unclear, however,
why Professor Fratcher proposed the actual knowledge standard instead of his preferred
complete immunity standard, and it is unclear why Professor Fratcher presented his
actual knowledge standard rhetorically.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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seven has not surfaced previously because section seven is for all practical
purposes an ineffective statutory provision. The vast majority of transactions
governed by section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act also fall
within the scope of the corresponding provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Section seven's "actual knowledge
with absolutely no duty of inquiry" standard conflicts with the "good faith and
limited duty of inquiry" standard required by the corresponding provisions of
these other uniform laws. Faced with the conflicting standards of liability,
third parties interested in dealing with a trustee no doubt conform their
conduct to the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard to avoid any
risk of liability created by the conflict. Even if the Uniform Law Commission
adopted section seven intending to reject the good faith and limited duty of
inquiry standard, absent a clearer statement to that effect,, section seven is
ineffective.
Accordingly, section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act cries out
for clarification. The Uniform Law Commission adopted section seven
without proper research or analysis. Section seven currently adds only conflict
and confusion to the law of trusts, and in particular to the law governing
transactions with trustees. 13 Any re-examination of section seven should
begin with the presumption that the proper standard of liability for third
parties dealing with a trustee is the good faith and limited duty of inquiry
standard. The good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard imposes
minimal costs on trust administration efficiency while providing greater
protection for trust beneficiaries than is provided by the actual knowledge
standard. In accordance with the spirit and intent of the uniform law system,
section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act should be amended to
incorporate the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements so that the
uniform laws addressing the liability of third parties dealing with a fiduciary
14
will in fact be uniform.

13. Section 7 also adds confusion to the law of trusts with respect to the
traditional requirement that to receive trust property free from claims the third party
must give valuable consideration. Although the legislative history behind § 7 indicates
that 7's actual knowledge with no duty of inquiry standard is a mistake, the legislative
history provides no clue with respect to why the Committee made no mention of the
valuable consideration requirement. The only conclusion is that the Committee did not
even think about this traditional requirement.
14. The status of the valuable consideration requirement should also be clarified.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND TO SECTION SEVEN
OF THE UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS

ACT

A. The Common Law and Statutory Importance of the Good
Faith and Duty of Inquiry Requirements
At common law, to receive property from a trustee free of the trust and
free of liability to the trust beneficiaries, the third party has to meet the
requirements of a bona fide purchaser:
(1) pay valuable consideration, (2)
act in good faith,' 6 and (3) lack notice' 7 that the transaction constitutes a
breach of trust. Although the last requirement, the absence of notice, does not
on its face appear to be that difficult to satisfy, one has to remember the

15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 284; G. BOGERT, supra
note 2, § 881; A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 284. The common law rule
results from applying basic equity principles to the trust relationship. Equity provides
that where two parties claim competing interests in a matter, the party first in time will
prevail unless the later party is a bonafide purchaser. 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 413-417 (4th ed. 1918); 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 745 (4th ed. 1918). To constitute a bonafide purchaser, a
party has to: (1) pay valuable consideration, (2) act in good faith, and (3) lack notice
of any competing interest in the matter. 2 J. POMEROY, supra, §§ 745-761.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 284; G. BOGERT, supra
note 2, § 881; A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 284. Both Bogert and Scott
and Fratcher are unclear with respect to whether good faith is a separate requirement
or simply an element of the notice requirement. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS implicitly sets forth the good faith requirement as a distinct requirement, but
restates it as requiring that the third party "not knowingly tak[e] part in an illegal
transaction." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 284,290 (1959). The traditional
common law view is that good faith is both a distinct requirement of the bona fide
purchaser requirement and a component of the notice requirement. If the party has
notice of a competing interest, the party lacks good faith and takes the property in
question subject to the competing interest. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 15, §§ 745-761.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 284; G. BOGERT, supra
note 2, § 881; A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 284. The common law
notice element is a broad concept. Notice of a competing interest can be either actual
or constructive. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 15, §§ 593, 595-603, 604-09. It is
generally accepted that the distinction between actual notice and cofstructive notice
turns on the manner in which the notice is received. Id. § 595. Notice is actual when
knowledge of a particular fact has been personally communicated to the individual.
Id.; 66 C.J.S. Notice § 3 (1950). Notice is constructive when knowledge of a
particular fact is imputed to the party even in the absence of any evidence that the fact
has been personally communicated to the individual. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 15,
§ 604; 66 C.J.S. Notice §§ 5-7.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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common law duty of inquiry.18 Under the broad common law duty of
inquiry, if the third party simply knows or should know that it is dealing with
a trustee, then the third party has notice of a potentially competing interest
(the interest of the trust beneficiaries). Accordingly, in any transaction
involving a trustee, the third party has a duty to inquire into the trustee's
powers to consummate the transaction. 9 If the third party fails to inquire
into the trustee's power to consummate a transaction which constitutes a
breach of trust and which a reasonably diligent inquiry would reveal as a
breach of trust, the third party receives the property subject to a continuing
trust and is equally liable with the trustee for participating in the' breach of
trust.20 The effect of such a broad common law standard of liability is to

make third parties who transact with a trustee guarantors of the trustee's
power to consummate the transaction-a guarantee that effectively deters third
parties from dealing with trustees.21
The bona fide purchaser and duty of inquiry requirements worked well
in the relatively slow-paced, land-oriented economy of medieval England. As
society progressed and commerce grew increasingly investment oriented,
however, the bona fide purchaser and duty of inquiry requirements grew
increasingly burdensome. This was particularly true with respect to transactions involving commercial paper, negotiable instruments, and investment
securities, and even more so with respect to such transactions when a fiduciary
was involved.
Accordingly, to facilitate" transactions involving such
commodities generally, and in particular such transactions when a fiduciary
is involved, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
adopted uniform laws which address the liability of parties involved in such

18. The duty of inquiry provides that where a party has notice (again, either actual
or constructive) of facts which raise the possibility of a competing interest, but do not
establish conclusively a competing interest, the party has a duty to inquire further into
the existence of the competing interest. If the party fails to inquire further, the party
is chargeable with the knowledge which it could have acquired if it had conducted a

reasonably diligent inquiry. G. BOGERT, supra note 2, § 894.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 297 comments c-f; G.
BOGERT, supra note 2, § 894; A. ScoTr & W. FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 297.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 297 comments c-f; G.
BOGERT, supra note 2, § 894; A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 297.
21. W.

FRATCHER,

Trust, in IV INT'L

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW §

100 (F. Lawson ed. 1972). Although there is no equity stronger than the equity of a
bona fide purchaser, the broad common law absence of notice requirement coupled

with the broad common law duty of inquiry make achieving the bona fide purchaser
status a potentially burdensome task. 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 15, §§ 413-415, 416417; 2 POMEROY, supra note 15, § 745. Achieving the bona fide purchaser status is
nowhere more burdensome at common law than it is for third parties dealing with a

fiduciary, and in particular, a trustee.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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transactions.' Although these uniform laws retain the traditional common
law principle that the purchaser has to be a bona fide purchaser, the uniform
laws modify substantially (1) the notice element of the common law bonafide
purchaser principle (which directly affects the third parties' duty to inquire),
and (2) the good faith element of the common law bona fide purchaser
principle.
First, the uniform laws modify the basic bonafide purchaser principle by
narrowing the common law notice concept and its concomitant duty of
inquiry. The uniform laws reject the broad common law concept of notice of
a potentially adverse claim' and specifically provide that a party has notice
of a potentially adverse interest only if the party has knowledge of certain
24 In
limited enumerated facts which create a presumption of impropriety.
addition, the enumerated definitions specifically address what constitutes
notice of an adverse claim when dealing with a fiduciary. The uniform laws
expressly reject that notice of an adverse claim may arise simply from the fact
that a third party has notice that it is dealing with a fiduciary.25 The uniform
laws expressly provide that a third party dealing with a fiduciary has notice
of a potentially adverse claim if the third party has knowledge that the
fiduciary personally will benefit from the transaction.26 The effect of
narrowing when a third party has notice of an adverse claim is to narrow the
third party's duty to inquire. 27 Inasmuch as a third party's duty to inquire
is limited to situations where it has notice of the potentially adverse claim, the
uniform laws limit the third party's duty to inquire by the definition of notice.
Accordingly, a third party has no duty to inquire simply because it knows it
is dealing with a fiduciary. Under the uniform laws, a third party dealing with

22. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1), 3-304(2), 8-302, 8-304(2) (1977); U.F.A. §§ 4-9, 7A
U.L.A. 405-17 (1990).
23. Supra note 17.
24. U.C.C. §§ 3-304, 8-304, 8-304 (1977); U.F.A. §§ 4-5, 7-9, 7A U.L.A. 405-10,
413-23 (1990).
25. See U.C.C. §§ 3-304(4)(e), 8-304(2) (1977). The U.F.A. does not expressly
reject the broad common law duty of inquiry based simply on the fact that a party
knows it is dealing with a fiduciary, but the rejection of the broad common law duty
of inquiry is implicit in the wording of the provisions and the official comments

thereto (especially the comments to § 6). U.F.A. §§ 4-9, 7A U.L.A. 139-52 (1990).
26. U.C.C. § 3-304(2), 8-304(2) (1977); U.F.A. §§ 4-5, 7-9, 7A U.L.A. 139-44,
148-52 (1990). See also U.F.A. § 6, 7A U.L.A. 410-11 comment (1990).
27. Although the uniform laws make no express reference to a limited duty of
inquiry, the effect of notice under the uniform laws is tantamount to a limited duty of
inquiry. If the third party wants to receive the property free from any adverse claims,
but the party has notice (as narrowly defined by the uniform laws) of a potentially
adverse claim, in essence the third party has a limited duty to inquire into the
transaction to ensure that it is not a breach of the fiduciary's obligation.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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a fiduciary has only a limited duty to inquire when the third party has notice
(as defined by the uniform laws) of those enumerated situations which create
a presumption of impropriety (that is, if the third party knows that the
fiduciary will benefit personally from the transaction).8
Second, the uniform laws modify the common law bona fide purchaser
principle by narrowing the common law good faith concept. Because the
common law defines good faith objectively, good faith is practically
synonymous with and subsumed under the notice requirement. 29 At common
law, if a party has actual or constructive notice of an adverse claim and
proceeds with the transaction, the third party lacks good faith. 30 The uniform
laws modify the common law good faith concept by defining it subjectively.3 Accordingly, under the uniform laws, the third party lacks good faith
only if it has actual knowledge of an adverse claim to the property (that is, if
the party has actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of
fiduciary obligation), or bad faith constructive notice (as opposed to mere
negligent constructive notice) 32 of an adverse claim. The effect of the

28. U.C.C. § 3-304(2), 8-304(2) (1977). In addition, the uniform laws' good faith
requirement implicitly contains a limited duty of inquiry. If a third party has notice
of facts which raise questions about the propriety of the transaction, but the third party
intentionally (as opposed to negligently) fails to inquire into the propriety of the
transaction so as to avoid actual knowledge of the impropriety, the third party is guilty
of bad faith and takes the property subject to any adverse claims. Accordingly, while
the uniform laws do not expressly set forth a duty of inquiry, the limited absence of
notice requirement is tantamount to imposing a limited duty of inquiry where the party
has notice (as statutory defined by the uniform laws) of a potentially adverse claim,
and the good faith requirement implicitly contains a limited duty of inquiry if a failure
to inquire would constitute subjective bad faith.
29. Supra note 16.
30. Id.
31. The U.C.C. defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977). The U.F.A. defines good faith similarly: "A
thing is done 'in good faith' within the meaning of this act, when it is in fact done
honestly, whether it be done negligently or not." U.F.A. § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 396
(1990).
32. At common law there is great disagreement over what constitutes constructive
notice and the number of different types of constructive notice. For purposes of this
discussion, however, constructive notice can be divided into two general types:
negligent constructive notice and bad faith constructive notice. Negligent constructive
notice is when the party charged with notice has actual notice of a particular fact or
facts which place upon the party a duty to inquire further, and the party negligently
fails to inquire further; the party is charged with constructive notice of those facts
which a diligent inquiry would have revealed. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 15, § 605.
Bad faith constructive notice is when the party charged with notice has actual notice
of a particular fact or facts which place upon the party a duty to inquire further, and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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uniform laws' subjective good faith definition coupled with the limited notice
definition is to reject common law constructive notice as the basis of liability
unless (1) the constructive notice falls within one of the limited statutory
definitions of notice, or (2) the constructive notice is bad faith constructive
notice.
The uniform laws' modifications of the bona fide purchaser principle
increase the protection accorded third parties dealing with a fiduciary. The
uniform laws reject the broad common law duty of inquiry in favor of a much
narrower limited duty of inquiry standard. Further, the uniform laws reject the
broad, objective common law notice concept in favor of the narrower,
subjective good faith requirement.33 It was against this common law and
statutory background that the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act was drafted and
adopted, and it is against this common law and statutory background that
section seven of the Act should be evaluated.
B. Section Seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act:
Unusually and Inexplicably Broad Protectionfor Third
PartiesDealing With a Trustee
Section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act expressly governs the
liability of third parties transacting with a trustee. Section seven provides:

§7. [Third parties Protected in Dealing with Trustee]
With respect to a third party dealing with a trustee or assisting a
trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust powers and
their proper exercise by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The
third party is not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or
is properly exercising the power; and a third party, without actual
knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising

the party intentionally refuses to inquire further because the party wants to avoid
knowledge of damagingfacts; the party is charged with constructive notice of those
facts which a diligent inquiry would have revealed. Id. The critical distinction
between negligent constructive notice and bad faith constructive notice is that in the
former the party charged with notice objectively should have inquired further, but
subjectively was unaware of this duty; in the latter, the party charged with notice
subjectively knew he or she should have inquired further but intentionally refused to
do so in the hope of avoiding potentially damaging information. See infra notes 58-60.
33. It should be noted that although the U.C.C. modifies the valuable consideration requirement, the U.C.C. expressly retains the requirement that a third party
transacting with a fiduciary must give value to take the property free of any adverse
claims. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 8-302 (1977). In light of the U.C.C.'s express retention
of the for value requirement, the U.T.P.A.'s failure to retain or even address the
requirement is a complete mystery. See U.T.P.A. § 7, 7B U.L.A. 758 (1990).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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them, isfully protected in dealing with the trustee as if the trustee possessed
and properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise. A third person
is not bound to assure the proper application of trust assets paid or
delivered to the trustee.'
Section seven expressly rejects both the broad common law duty of inquiry
and the limited duty of inquiry retained by the other uniform laws. In
addition, section seven implicitly rejects both the common law bona fide
purchaser standard of liability and the good faith standard of liability adopted
by the other uniform laws. Section seven's actual knowledge with absolutely
no duty of inquiry standard of liability constitutes a significant departure from
Inasmuch as section
both common law and the other uniform laws.
seven sets forth a new standard of liability for third parties dealing with a
trustee, one would expect to find a thorough explanation for why the Uniform
Law Commission adopted section seven's actual knowledge with no duty of
inquiry standard and rejected both the common law bona fide purchaser and
broad duty of inquiry standard and the prevailing uniform law good faith and
limited duty of inquiry standard. Yet the Uniform Law Commission gives
absolutely no explanation. There is neither an official comment to section
seven35 nor an official prefatory note to the Uniform Trustees' Powers
Act.36 The closest one can get to an official explanation of the Act in
general, and section seven in particular, is an article by Charles Horowitz, the
chairman of the Uniform Law Commission's Special Committee which drafted
the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act.37

34. U.T.P.A. § 7, 7B U.L.A. 758 (1990) (emphasis added).
35. U.T.P.A. § 7, 7B U.L.A. 758-59 (1990).
36. U.T.P.A. § 1, 7B U.L.A. 743 (1990); but see 1964 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L
CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PROC. OF THE ANN. CONF.

MEETING IN ITS SEvENTY-THIRD YEAR 265 (1964) (setting forth a Prefatory Note to

the U.T.P.A., which is merely descriptive and contains no analysis of or explanation

for the different statutory provisions).
37. 1964 HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 15. The other members of the Special
Committee responsible for drafting the U.T.P.A. were Howard Dresbach, Robert B.
Harwood, A. Pratt Kesler and R. Jasper Smith. All of the members of the Committee
have either passed away or were unable to provide information about the Committee's
thought processes with respect to § 7.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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C. ChairmanHorowitz'sArticle: The Uniform Law
Commission Never Realized Section Seven Rejects the
Good Faith and Limited Duty of Inquiry
Requirements
Horowitz's article claims to address the basic approach of the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act and the changes the Act makes in the traditional law of
trusts.3 8 Horowitz acknowledges that section seven "makes important
changes" from the common law rules of liability. 39 Horowitz fails, however,
to state exactly how section seven differs from the common law. Reading
between the lines, Horowitz appears to be referring to section seven's rejection
of the broad common law duty of inquiry and to section seven's rejection of
liability based upon the broad constructive notice which followed from the
broad common law duty of inquiry. There is no doubt that section seven's
rejection of these common law trust principles constitutes an important change
in the standard of liability for third parties dealing with a trustee. There is no
evidence, however, that the Special Committee responsible for drafting the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act intentionally rejected the good faith and limited
duty of inquiry standard prevailing in the other uniform laws addressing the
liability of a third party dealing with a fiduciary. In fact, the only evidence

available indicates that the Special Committee thought section seven retained
the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements.
After acknowledging that section seven constitutes an important change
from the common law, Horowitz claims that this change is "vital in order to
make section 3 workable." 41 Section three of the Uniform Trustees' Powers
Act is the heart of the Act. Section three drastically changes the law of trusts
by granting a trustee all the powers a prudent man would have with respect
to his own property. 4' Horowitz claims that without section seven, "third
persons might never safely deal with a trustee for fear that he was exceeding
his trust powers under the prudent man standard." 42 It is true that the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act's enhanced powers for trustees would be
ineffective without greater protection for third parties dealing with a trustee
than was accorded third parties at common law. It does not automatically
follow, however, that the appropriate degree of protection for the third parties
is complete abolition of the duty of inquiry and complete protection unless the
third party has actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his or her
powers. Inasmuch as the other uniform laws retain a limited duty of inquiry
38. Horowitz, Uniform Trustees' PowersAct, 41 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1966).
39. Id. at 28.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 8-25.

42. Id. at 28.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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and apply a good faith standard (either expressly or implicitly by imposing
liability in the case of actual knowledge or bad faith),43 the obvious question
is why the Special Committee in charge of drafting the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act rejected the prevailing approach adopted by the other uniform
laws and decided not to retain a limited duty of inquiry and good faith
standard.
Surprisingly, Horowitz fails to address why the Special Committee
decided to break with the other uniform laws. Moreover, Horowitz's only
references to the other uniform laws and to the duty of inquiry and good faith
requirements imply that the Committee thought it was retaininga limited duty
of inquiry and good faith requirement. In a footnote to Horowitz's claim that
the trustees' enhanced powers would be unworkable without the broad
protection accorded third parties under section seven, Horowitz mused:
The substance of section seven, in part at least, might in time be adopted
decisionally. Thus it has been held that where a trustee, by terms of the
trust, has power to transfer or encumber trust property, a third party dealing
with him in good faith is not bound to ascertain whether the act of the

trustee is justified unless the transaction, in view of the trust relation, is an
unusual one. 54 Am. Jur. Trusts § 270 (1945). Section seven follows, but
on a broad front, the more limited precedent changing the common law set
by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act which protects third persons
acting in good
4
faith in certain types of dealings with the fiduciary. "
Read carefully, the footnote indicates that the Committee thought that
section seven retained a limited duty of inquiry and a good faith requirement.
The first sentence's reference to the "substance of section seven" coupled with
the second sentence's reference to "good faith" imply that the substance of
section seven is that a third party dealing with a trustee in good faith is
protected from liability. This good faith implication is buttressed by the latter
half of the second sentence which qualifies the protection offered the third
party. In the event the transaction is an unusual one, the third party is not
protected absolutely but rather has a limited duty to inquire into whether the
trustee is authorized to act. Although the footnote clearly indicates the
Committee rejected the broad common law duty of inquiry based solely on the
fact that the third party has notice that it is dealing with a trustee, the footnote
implies a limited duty to inquire when the transaction is an unusual one, with
potential liability based upon a bad faith failure to inquire. Although the
express language of section seven contains no reference to either a "good
faith" or "bad faith" standard, and the express language of section seven
repudiates any duty to inquire, the first two sentences of the footnote indicate

43. Supra notes 27-28, 31-32.
44. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 28 n.153 (emphasis added).
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that the Committee thought section seven contained the good faith and limited
duty of inquiry standard.
The footnote's discussion of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act further supports
a finding that the Committee thought section seven retained the good faith and
limited duty of inquiry requirements. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act has a
rather limited purpose: to facilitate banking and financial transactions
45
involving negotiable instruments when one of the parties is a fiduciary.
Likewise, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act has rather limited application, applying
to only three classes of people: "1. Persons paying money or transferring other
property to fiduciaries .... 3. Persons receiving negotiable instruments....
[and] 4. Depositories of fiduciary funds.,4 6 Like the Uniform Commercial
Code,47 with respect to these limited transactions the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act rejects the general common law duty of inquiry based upon mere notice

that one is dealing with a fiduciary and instead retains a limited duty of
inquiry where the third party knows the fiduciary is benefitting personally
from the transaction. 8 Moreover, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act rejects the

45. Colby v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1937); U.F.A.,
PrefatoryNote, 7A U.L.A. 391-92 (1990).
46. U.F.A., Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 392 (1990); see also Colby,. 92 F.2d at
188-93. As the numbers in the quotation indicate, the U.F.A. originally covered four
types of transactions. But the third enumerated type of transaction, "corporations, etc.,
whose securities are registered in the names of fiduciaries," has been "superseded by
the Uniform Act for Simplification of Security Transfers, or by Uniform Commercial
Code, Art. 8." U.F.A., Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 392 (1990).
47. U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-304, 8-302, 8-304 (1977).
48. Sections 4-5 and 9 expressly provide that the third party dealing with the
fiduciary "is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his
obligation as fiduciary" by engaging in the specific conduct governed by the particular
provision. U.F.A. §§ 4-5, 9, 7A U.L.A. 405-07, 417 (1990). Sections 7-8 implicitly
reject the broad common law duty of inquiry by limiting the third party's liability to
cases where the third party (1) has "actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing
a breach" of its fiduciary obligation; (2) has knowledge of such facts that the third
party's participation in the transaction constitutes bad faith; or (3) receives the
instrument from the fiduciary "in payment of or as security for a personal debt of the
fiduciary," and the transaction in fact constitutes a breach of the fiduciary's obligation.
U.F.A. §§ 7-8, 7A U.L.A. 413-15 (1990). The effect of the last class of liability is,
in essence, to create a limited duty of inquiry where the transaction is for the personal
benefit of the fiduciary. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 297 comment o
(1959). This limited duty of inquiry is required under §§ 4, 5, 7 and 8. U.F.A. §§ 45, 7, 8, 7A U.L.A. 405-07, 413, 415 (1990). Section 6, which governs checks drawn
by and payable to the fiduciary, eliminates this limited duty of inquiry on the grounds
that the payment to the fiduciary may be a legitimate payment of expenses or
compensation. U.F.A. § 6 comment, 7A U.L.A. 410-12 (1990); see also A. ScoTt &
W. FRATCHER, supra note 2, § 297.6.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7

14

1991]

UNIFORM
POWERS
ACTand Inexplicably Broad
Wendel: Wendel:
ExaminingTRUSTEES'
the Mystery behind
the Unusually

common law bona fide purchaser requirement and instead imposes liability
upon a third party for participating in a breach of fiduciary obligation only if
the third party has actual knowledge of the breach or has knowledge of such
facts that the third party's participation in the transaction constitutes bad
faith.4 9 Although the Act does not define the term "bad faith," it defines an
act done "in good faith" as "when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be
done negligently or not."5 The courts consistently interpret and apply the
bad faith test consistent with the bad faith constructive notice concept at
common law.51 If the third party knows of facts that raise its suspicions as
to the propriety of the transaction, but the third party intentionally decides to
avoid investigating further in the hope of avoiding potentially damaging
information, the party is charged with the information a diligent inquiry would
have revealed.5
As noted above, and as Horowitz correctly states in the footnote, the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act protects third parties acting in good faith in certain
types of dealings with the fiduciary. 3 The question then is how to interpret
the footnote's statement that section seven "follows, but on a broad front, the
more limited precedent ...set by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. 5 4 Should
this phrase be construed to mean that the limited precedent set by the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act is that third parties acting in good faith are protected only in
limited types of dealings and that section seven follows this precedent by
adopting the good faith requirement and applying it on a broad front to all
dealings with a trustee? Or should the phrase be construed to mean that the
limited precedent set by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act is that the Act rejected

49. U.F.A. §§ 4-9, 7A U.L.A. 405-17 (1990); supra notes 31-32.
50. U.F.A. § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 396 (1990).
51. Supra note 32.
52. See Davis v. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities, 337
Pa. 456, 460, 12 A.2d 66, 69 (1940). The court states:
At what point does negligence cease and bad faith begin? The
. distinction between them is that bad faith, or dishonesty, is,
unlike negligence, wilful. The mere failure to make inquiry,
even though there [may] be suspicious circumstances, does not
constitute bad faith unless such failure is due to the deliberate
desire to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that
inquiry would disclose a vice or defect in the transaction, -that
is to say, where there is an intentional closing of the eyes or
stopping of the ears.
Id. (citation omitted); accord Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. Bolger & Picker, 512
Pa. 116, 125-26, 516 A.2d 299, 304 (1986); Research-Planning, Inc. v. Bank of Utah,
690 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1984).
53. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 28 n.153; supra notes 45-48.
54. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 28 n.153.
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the broad common law bona fide purchaser standard but moved only so far as
protecting third parties acting in good faith? Interpreted this way, section
seven follows the principle of increased protection for third parties but on a
broad front by extending protection to third parties unless they have actual
knowledge that the trustee is acting improperly.
The footnote's reference to the Uniform Fiduciaries Act should be
construed to mean that the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act follows the limited
precedent set by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act by adopting the good faith
requirement and extending it to all dealings with a trustee. This is the more
reasonable and logical interpretation. This interpretation is supported by the
footnote's first two sentences which expressly refer to the good faith
requirement and limited duty of inquiry.55 Moreover, if the proper interpretation were the latter interpretation, inasmuch as the actual knowledge standard
does not just follow the standard set forth by the other uniform laws but rather
constitutes a new and significantly narrower standard of liability, 56 one would
expect a more thorough analysis and justification for the new standard. The
only statement even approaching an explanation is the conclusory claim that
without greater protection for third parties dealing with a trustee the prudent
man standard for the trustees' powers would not work because third parties
could not safely deal with the trustee for fear that the trustee was exceeding
the trust powers.'
Again, while this claim is correct with respect to the
change section seven made in repudiating the broad common law duty of
inquiry based simply upon the third party's notice that it is dealing with a
trustee, it does not necessarily follow that the standard to apply should be one
of actual knowledge as opposed to good faith. Taken as a whole, the footnote
indicates that Horowitz, and no doubt the rest of the Committee, believed that
section seven, like the other uniform laws addressing the liability of third
parties dealing with a trustee, retained the good faith and limited duty of
inquiry requirements.
At first glance the impression created by the footnote appears to be in
direct conflict with the accompanying text of the article which discusses
section seven. The text of the article expressly provides that
[i]t is to be noted that constructive knowledge, as distinguished from actual
knowledge, is not enough [for a third party to lose the protection of the
act]. Therefore, mere suspicion that limitations exist or knowledge of facts
which, if pursued, would show that limitations exist do not deprive a third
person of this protection. 8

55. Id.
56. Infra note 94.

57. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 28.
58. Id. at 28-29 (footnote omitted).
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The key to understanding this text, however, is understanding what Horowitz
meant when he used the term "constructive knowledge."
At common law, there are basically two types of constructive knowledge:
negligent constructive knowledge, and bad faith constructive knowledge.59
Negligent constructive knowledge occurs when the party has actual notice of
a particular fact or facts which impose upon the party a duty to 'inquire
further, but the party negligently fails to inquire further. 60 Bad faith
constructive knowledge occurs when the party has actual notice of a particular
fact or facts which impose upon the party a duty to inquire further, but the
party intentionally refuses to inquire into the facts in question because the
party wants to avoid knowledge or notice of the facts in question. 61 The
critical difference between negligent constructive knowledge and bad faith
constructive knowledge is that in the former the party charged with constructive knowledge objectively should have inquired further but negligently failed
to do so. In the latter, the party charged with bad faith constructive
knowledge subjectively knew it should have inquired further but consciously
decided not to inquire further in the hope of avoiding potentially damaging
information. At common law, it does not matter whether the constructive
knowledge is negligent or bad faith, the party is charged with knowledge of
those facts which a reasonably diligent inquiry would reveal. 62 On the other
hand, the other uniform laws addressing the liability of a third party dealing
with a fiduciary reject the broad common law duty of inquiry and liability
based upon negligent constructive knowledge, but retain liability based upon
bad faith.63

Horowitz neither defines the term "constructive knowledge," nor
expressly indicates whether the Committee was rejecting liability based upon
negligent constructive knowledge or bad faith constructive knowledge or both.
A close reading of his use of the term, however, indicates that the Committee
was rejecting only liability based on the broad common law negligent
constructive knowledge imputed to a third party dealing with a trustee simply
because the third party knew or should have known it was dealing with a
trusteeF'4 In a footnote to his discussion of the Committee's rejection of
liability based upon constructive knowledge, Horowitz notes that "[a]t
common law, congtructive knowledge was enough [to impose liability on the
third party for participating in the breach of trust]." 65 In support of that

59. See supra note 32.

60. Id.

61. 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 15, § 605.
62. Id.
63. Supra notes 31-32.
64. Id.
65. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 29 n.157.
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comment, Horowitz cites the reader to a previous footnote" which sets forth
the general common law duty of inquiry and the negligent constructive
knowledge which flows at common law from that general duty of inquiry:
"At common law, third persons knowingly dealing with trustees are generally
held to a duty of inquiry and are chargeable with constructive knowledge of
a trustee's breach of duty which they might reasonablyhave discovered in the
exercise of due care." 67 The statement that the third party is chargeable with
the "constructive knowledge" it could have "reasonably... discovered in the
exercise of due care" corresponds with the broad common law concept of
negligent constructive knowledge. When Horowitz uses the term "constructive
knowledge," he is referring to the broad common law concept of negligent
constructive knowledge, not liability based upon bad faith constructive
knowledge.
That Horowitz used the term "constructive knowledge" to mean negligent
constructive knowledge is supported by a close reading of the text. After
stating that section seven rejects liability based upon constructive knowledge,
the text states, "Therefore, mere suspicion that limitations exist or knowledge
of facts which, if pursued, would show that limitations exist do not deprive a
third person of this protection."' Read in connection with the text's prior
sentence which expressly rejects liability based upon constructive knowledge,
it is clear that the quoted sentence implicitly defines Horowitz's use of the
term constructive knowledge as negligent constructive knowledge. More
importantly, this definition tracks the language the courts have repeatedly and
consistently used when applying the bad faith standard contained in the other
uniform laws, to indicate the difference between a party's negligent failure to
inquire as opposed to a party's bad faith. The courts have repeatedly and
consistently held that a third party's mere suspicion of an adverse interest
constitutes at best negligence and does not constitute bad faith on the part of
the third party dealing with the fiduciary. 9 Therefore, the text's express
rejection of liability based upon mere suspicions indicates that the Committee
rejected only the broad common law negligent constructive knowledge which
was imputed to a third party simply because the third party was dealing with

66. Id.
67. Id. at 4 n.24.
68. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
69. For U.F.A. cases, see supra note 52; for U.C.C. article 3 cases, see Valley
Nat'l Bank v. Porter, 705 F.2d 1027, 1029 (8th Cir. 1983); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 533 F. Supp. 378, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and
cases cited in U.C.C. § 3-302 n.6 (1977); for U.C.C. article 8 cases, see In re Legel,
Braswell Gov't Sec. Corp., 648 F.2d 321, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1981); Matthysse v.
Securities Processing Serv., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1009, 1021-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and
cases cited in U.C.C. § 8-302 n.4 (1977).
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a trustee. The text's discussion of section seven is consistent with the position
that the Committee believed that section seven contained the good faith and
limited duty of inquiry requirements.
That Horowitz's use of the term constructive knowledge should be
construed to mean negligent constructive knowledge is further supported by
the footnotes accompanying the text. Construing the term constructive
knowledge to mean negligent constructive knowledge avoids any conflict
between the text and the accompanying footnote's references to the good faith
requirement and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.7' Further, Horowitz's whole
discussion of the changes effected by section seven is but several conclusory
sentences.71 While the sentences note the changes between section seven and
the common law, the sentences make no reference to any changes between
section seven and the corresponding provisions of the other uniform laws
addressing the liability of a third party dealing with a fiduciary.72 If section
seven were intended to be a break with the prevailing good faith and limited
duty of inquiry standard set forth in the other uniform laws, one would expect
Horowitz at least to note the difference and present some analysis of the
reasons for the break from the other uniform laws.
Therefore, based upon Horowitz's comments as Chairman of the Special

Committee responsible for drafting the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, it is
apparent the Committee believed that section seven retained the good faith and
limited duty of inquiry requirements. The Committee focused on the
indisputable need to reject the broad common law duty of inquiry and the
negligent constructive knowledge which flowed from this duty.73 There is
no evidence that the Committee specifically rejected or even considered the
prevailing good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard of liability adopted
by the other uniform laws. Instead, the Committee thought section seven
contained the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements. Moreover,
the draft of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act which came out of the Special
Committee responsible for drafting the legislation was adopted by the National

70. See supra notes 45-47.
71. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 28-29.
72. Id.
73. Horowitz repeatedly footnotes the whole discussion of § 7 back to his earlier
footnote discussion of the common law duty of inquiry. Horowitz, supra note 38, at
28-29 & nn. 152-57. With respect to the common law duty of inquiry, Horowitz
noted: "At common law, third persons knowingly dealing with trustees are generally
held to a duty of inquiry and are chargeable with constructive knowledge of a trustee's
breach of duty which they might reasonably have discovered in the exercise of due
care." Id. at 4 n.24. Again, the focus is on the constructive knowledge arising out of
the common law duty of inquiry. There is no evidence that the Special Committee
responsible for drafting section seven considered the duty of inquiry implicit in the bad
faith standard of liability.
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws without discussion. 74
Accordingly, the only available direct evidence from the drafting process itself
indicates that section seven's actual knowledge with absolutely no duty of
inquiry standard appears to have been more of a mistake than the result of a
carefully researched and analyzed decision.
The only other evidence which may shed some light on the issue of
whether the Committee knowingly rejected the good faith and duty of inquiry
requirements or whether their rejection was accidental is a 1962 article by
Professor William F. Fratcher,75 one of the leading authorities on the law of
trusts.7 6 Although not an official part of the Special Committee's decisionmaking process, Professor Fratcher's article appears to have played a
significant role in the Special Committee's drafting process.77 Horowitz's
article expressly acknowledges that the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in
general, and the no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge standard for third
party liability in particular, are based upon Professor Fratcher's article. 78 If
Professor Fratcher's article presents a clear statement that the no duty of
inquiry and actual knowledge standard is a break from the prevailing standard
expressed in the other uniform laws, and if the article presents a thorough
analysis of the reasons for the break, then one must assume that the Committee's adoption of Professor Fratcher's article as the basis for the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act includes this analysis. On the other hand, if Professor
Fratcher's article does not present a clear and thorough discussion of the no
duty of inquiry and actual knowledge standard, this omission only further
supports the position that the Committee not only did not realize section seven
killed the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements but that in fact
the Committee thought that section seven retained the good faith and limited
duty of inquiry requirements.

74. 1964

HANDBOOK,

supra note 36, at 133.

75. Fratcher, Trustees' PowersLegislation, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (1962).

76. It is impossible in a footnote to do justice to Professor Fratcher's contributions
to the law of trusts and estates. As this Article implicitly states, for all practical
purposes Professor Fratcher adhered the U.T.P.A., and he was one of the reporters who
drafted the Uniform Probate Code. For a more thorough discussion of Professor
Fratcher's contributions to the law of trusts and estates, see the tribute to Professor
Fratcher in the Missouri Law Review on the occasion of his retirement from the
faculty. 48 Mo. L. REV. 313, 313-24 (1983).

77. Horowitz's Uniform Trustees' PowersAct article cites Professor Fratcher's
Trustees' PowersLegislationarticle fifty-nine times; see also 1964 HANDBOOK, supra
note 36, at 265, wherein the Uniform Law Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the

U.T.P.A. expressly provides that "[flor a basic review of the underlying theory of the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, see Professor William F. Fratcher's article entitled
Trustees' Powers Legislation."
78. Horowitz, supra note 38, at 1, 7-8.
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An examination of Professor Fratcher's article reveals that not only does
the article not clearly indicate that the no duty of inquiry and actual
knowledge standard constitute a significant break from the other uniform laws
addressing the liability of a third party dealing with a fiduciary. The article
implies the exact opposite: that the no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge
standard is the prevailing standard in the other relevant uniform laws.79 The
article downplays the significance of the no duty of inquiry and actual
knowledge standard and presents no analysis of why the no duty of inquiry
and actual knowledge standard, as opposed to the prevailing good faith and
limited duty of inquiry standard, is necessary. 0
D. ProfessorFratcher'sTrustees' Powers Article: TheApparent
Source of the Special Committee's Confusion
Over Section Seven's Standardof Liabilityfor Third
PartiesDealing with a Trustee
In 1962, Professor Fratcher adhered a comprehensive and detailed article
which severely criticized the common law restrictive rules with respect to
trustees' powers as archaic, inefficient and inapplicable to the increasingly
common investment trust.8' Professor Fratcher similarly criticized the
common law duty of inquiry as "the great barrier to third party participation
and assistance in trustees' transactions. "82 With respect to the issue of
trustees' powers, Professor Fratcher advocated legislative adoption of a broad
prudent man standard: "to confer upon every trustee power to do whatever
a prudent man would do in the management of his own property for the trust
purposes." 3 Recognizing that such broad powers would be ineffective
without correspondingly broad protection for third parties interested in dealing
with trustees,8' Professor Fratcher argued for the abolition of the common
law duty of inquiry and for the adoption of the actual knowledge standard of
liability:
The Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial Code have
abolished the duty of inquiry in virtually all transactions concerning
negotiable instruments and investment securities, but little has been done as

79.
80.
81.
82.

See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
Id.
Fratcher, supra note 75, at 627-57.
Id. at 662; see also id. at 645-64.

83. Fratcher, supra note 75, at 660.
84. "No matter how broad his powers may be, a trustee cannot enter into
transactions involving third parties unless the third parties are willing to deal with or
assist him." Id. at 662.
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to other types of transactions. One who purchases half a million dollars
worth of corporate bonds from a trustee need not inquire into his powers
to sell and to give a receipt for the price, but one who buys a pig or a
rocking chair at a trustee's auction is bound to study the terms of the trust
and determine at his peril their correct legal meaning. The duty of inquiry
is especially onerous in land transactions because, if notice of a trust
appears in the chain of title, not only the original purchaser from the trustee
but every subsequent purchaser must diligently inquire into his powers.
Might it not be better to eliminate the duty of inquiry in all transactions
with trustees and make third parties who engage or assist in such transac-

tions liable to the cestui que trust only when they have actual knowledge
that the trustee is committing a breach of trust?"5
The quoted excerpt constitutes the whole discussion presented by Professor
Fratcher with respect to his proposed no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge
standard. In light of the prominent role played by the duty of inquiry and
good faith requirements at commoft law,86 and the prevailing limited duty of
inquiry and good faith requirements contained in the other uniform laws
addressing the liability of third parties dealing with a fiduciary,87 the article's
discussion of both the proposed no duty of inquiry and the proposed actual
knowledge standard of liability arguably is inadequate.
First, with respect to the duty of inquiry, although Professor Fratcher
notes that both the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code have abolished the duty of inquiry in virtually all transactions with
trustees,88 he recommends abolishing the duty of inquiry in all transactions
with trustees.8 9 Yet Professor Fratcher fails to address why the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act should abolish the duty of inquiry in all transactions.9"
Why should not the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act expressly preserve, as the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial Code do, a limited duty
of inquiry in cases where the transaction is prima facie wrongful?9
Second, there is no real analysis or explanation for why Professor
Fratcher proposes the actual knowledge standard. By juxtaposing the
references to the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial Code

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 662-63 (footnotes omitted).
See supra notes 15-20.
Supra notes 23-33.
Fratcher, supra note 75, at 662-63.

89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Supra note 28. Fratcher himself acknowledges this limited duty of inquiry
where the third party has "knowledge that the transaction is for the individual benefil
of the trustee or otherwise in breach of trust." Fratcher, supra note 75, at 648
(footnote omitted).
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with the proposal for the actual knowledge standard,' the article implies that
these other uniform acts apply the actual knowledge standard; but that is not
the case. Both the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code require good faith by a third party dealing with a trustee.93 At least
with respect to the proposed no duty of inquiry, a careful reading of Professor
Fratcher's proposal indicates that it constitutes a break with the prevailing
standard in the other uniform laws addressing the liability of a third party
dealing with a fiduciary. With respect to the proposed actual knowledge
standard, however, the proposal, and for that matter the whole article, never
indicates that the actual knowledge standard constitutes a break with the
prevailing good faith standard in the other uniform laws.94

92. Fratcher, supra note 75, at 662-63.
93. See supra note 6.
94. The inadequacy of the article's discussion of the proposed no duty of inquiry
and actual knowledge standard is so obvious, it prompts the obvious question of why
the article did not present a more thorough analysis of the proposal. There are three
possible explanations.
The first possible explanation for the lack of a more thorough analysis of the no
duty of inquiry and actual knowledge standard is that Professor Fratcher did not really
intend to eliminate completely the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements.
Like the Special Committee responsible for drafting the U.T.P.A., Professor Fratcher
could have simply been using the term 'actual knowledge' loosely and assumed that
it would be interpreted to include the good faith and limited duty of inquiry
components. But this explanation is difficult to accept. In the same paragraph in
which Professor Fratcher proposes his no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge
standard, he notes that the U.F.A. and the U.C.C. have not completely abolished the
duty of inquiry. Fratcher, supra note 75, at 662-63. In both of these uniform laws,
the limited duty of inquiry is inherently reserved in both the 'absence of notice'
requirement and in the good faith requirement. See supra notes 27-28. In addition,
these other uniform laws either expressly set forth the good faith requirement or do so
implicitly by imposing liability if the third party has "actual knowledge" that the

transaction constitutes a breach of fiduciary obligations or if the third party is acting
in "bad faith." See supra note 6. No doubt Professor Fratcher was well aware of the
exact language used in the other prevailing uniform laws and would have likewise
included an express language creating a good faith or limited duty of inquiry
component if he had intended to retain either requirement.
Another possible explanation for the lack of a more thorough discussion of the
no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge standard is that Professor Fratcher really had
not thought much about the standard of liability for a third party dealing with a trustee,
and he was simply throwing out the no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge standard
as a preliminary proposal for discussion. This possibility is supported by the manner
in which the standard was proposed. The proposal is phrased as a question, with the
introductory phrase "[m]ight it not be better" implying that this is simply a preliminary
idea for consideration and debate. Fratcher, supra note 75, at 662. On the other hand,
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Professor Fratcher himself emphasized in his article that the standard of liability for
a third party dealing with a trustee is critical to the success of his principal proposal
that the trustee inherently have all the powers that a prudent man would have with
respect to his own affairs. Id. at 658, 662. To then say that Professor Fratcher had
not really thought much about what would be the appropriate standard of liability for
a third party dealing with a trustee is difficult to accept. Moreover, this was not the
first time Professor Fratcher had proposed the actual knowledge standard. Professor
Fratcher had previously analyzed the issue of the standard of liability for third parties
dealing with guardians and had presented a more thorough analysis of the issue and
a more detailed argument that such third parties should be protected against liability
"in the absence of actual knowledge of wrongdoing." Fratcher, Powers and Duties of
GuardiansofProperty, 45 IOWA L. REv. 264, 329 (1960). Clearly Professor Fratcher
had thought through the actual knowledge standard of liability.
One last possible explanation for the lack of a more thorough explanation of the
no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge standard is that Professor Fratcher knew
exactly what he was doing when he rhetorically recommended the no duty of inquiry
and actual knowledge standard; he was proposing a radically new standard of liability
for third parties dealing with a trustee. There is no direct evidence to support this
possibility, but there is ample circumstantial evidence. First, as noted above, it is
difficult to believe that a person of Professor Fratcher's standing in the area of the law
of trusts would either be sloppy in his use of the term actual knowledge or would not
have thought seriously about the standard of liability for third parties dealing with a
trustee. In drafting his landmark article on trustees' powers legislation, Professor
Fratcher no doubt thought long and hard about the standard of liability for third parties
dealing with a trustee in the context of his proposal for the scope of the trustees'
powers. Professor Fratcher's trustees' powers proposal was driven by the goal of
maximizing trust administration effectiveness and efficiency:
In this country today trusts are commonly created for the investment
and active management of a fund. The settlor is not interested in keeping
particular land or other property in the family or in preserving its ancient
condition. He ordinarily intends that the trustee shall have all powers
needed for efficient and economical management with a view to production
of adequate income and enhancement of the principal for the benefit of the
cestuis que trust. .

.

. [I]n the absence of legislative augmentation of

trustees' powers, effective trust administration is too often prevented by
actual lack of power to enter into desirable transactions or by what is
equally obstructive, fear on the part of the trustee or those who deal with
him that he lacks the power to act.
Fratcher, supra note 75, at 658 (emphasis added).
Professor Fratcher dismissed other legislative attempts at augmenting the trustees'
powers as inefficient for the effective administration of the trust. Id. at 659. He
concluded that the "only wholly adequate solution" to the problem is the grant the
trustee all the powers which a prudent man would have for the efficient management
of his own property. Id. at 660.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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Just as Professor Fratcher strove to maximize the powers of the trustee so as to
maximize the efficient and effective administration of the trust, for those powers to be
effective Professor Fratcher needed to maximize the protection afforded third parties
interested in dealing with the trustee. For without adequate protection, third parties
would be deterred from transacting with a trustee, thereby undermining the efficient
and effective administration of the trust. Id. at 662. Given that the premise of the
U.T.P.A. is to maximize the efficient administration of the trust, the logical standard
of liability for third parties dealing with a trustee then would be complete immunity,
even when there is actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust.
Complete immunity is necessary because as long as there is any liability exposure, the
third party may hesitate and even decide not to transact with a trustee. Any obstacle
to transacting with a trustee hurts trust administration efficiency. Therefore, the logical
standard of liability for third'parties dealing with a trustee is complete immunity. Yet,
why did Professor Fratcher nonetheless recommend the actual knowledge standard and
not complete immunity?
There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that indicates why Professor
Fratcher settled on the actual knowledge standard instead of complete immunity. The
most logical explanation is that the actual knowledge standard may have been a
political compromise based on the realization that the Uniform Law Commission
would never adopt the complete immunity standard, but the Commission might adopt
the actual knowledge standard without realizing the significance of the standard.
Complete immunity, even when there is actual knowledge that the transaction
constitutes a breach of trust, is not just a significant departure from prevailing law, it
is revolutionary. Complete immunity for third parties dealing with a trustee would
have been a controversial proposal which would have stood out like a red flag. A
complete immunity proposal would have attracted widespread attention and no doubt
criticism, thereby providing extra ammunition for those critics who already thought
Professor Fratcher was going too far on the issue of the trustees' powers. See
Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the Basic Principlesof Fiduciary
Responsibility, 41 WASH. L. REV. 801, 801-02 (1966); Haskell, Some Problems with
the Uniform Trustees' PowersAct, 32 LAv & CONTEMP. PROBS. 168, 168 (1967).
The complete immunity standard would have jeopardized the principal part of
Fratcher's proposal: the prudent man standard with respect to trustees' powers. Rather
than risking jeopardizing the whole concept, Professor Fratcher may have decided to
compromise a bit on the issue of the standard of liability for third parties dealing with
a trustee.
Accordingly, instead of proposing complete immunity, Professor Fratcher may
have opted for the actual knowledge standard since in practice the actual knowledge
standard is very close to complete immunity. "It will rarely happen that a knowledge
of the fraud, or other fatal vice, can be brought home to the purchaser by positive
evidence ....

."

Pringle v. Phillips, 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. (5 Sandf.) 157, 172 (1851),

quoted in G. BOGERT, supra note 2, § 894. As between complete immunity and the
good faith standard adopted by the other uniform laws addressing the liability of third
parties dealing with a fiduciary, the actual knowledge standard is closer to the
complete immunity standard than it is to the good faith standard. Under the good faith
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standard of liability, there is always the risk that while there may be no direct evidence
that the purchaser had actual knowledge that the trustee was acting improperly, the
circumstantial evidence may be strong enough that the jury may be convinced that the
purchaser's failure to inquire could not have been the result of negligence but rather
only the result of a bad faith desire to avoid potentially damaging information. Id.
On the other hand, under the actual knowledge standard with absolutely no duty of
inquiry, in the absence of direct evidence of actual knowledge on the part of the third
party, evidence which is rarely present, there is no possibility of second guessing by
the jury. Therefore,, the actual knowledge with absolutely no duty of inquiry does
provide substantially greater security to a third party dealing with a trustee, thereby
facilitating transactions between third parties and trustees, which in turn promotes the
basic premise underlying the U.T.P.A.-to maximize the efficient and effective
administration of the modem day investment oriented trust. Although the actual
knowledge standard is still a significant departure from common law and the other
prevailing uniform laws, on its face the actual knowledge proposal does not stand out
as a departure from the other prevailing uniform laws.
It should be noted that the theory that Professor Fratcher wanted complete
immunity for third parties dealing with a trustee but compromised on actual knowledge
when he proposed the trustees' powers legislation is complete speculation based upon
lack of a more reasonable explanation for the actual knowledge standard. There is no
direct evidence that at the time Professor Fratcher proposed the prudent man standard
for the scope of the trustees' powers he wanted complete immunity for third parties
dealing with a trustee and that he compromised on the actual knowledge standard.
Moreover, there is no direct evidence that he intentionally downplayed the significance
of the actual knowledge standard. There is, however, direct evidence that not too long
after the Uniform Law Commissioners adopted and promulgated the U.T.P.A.,
Professor Fratcher wished and argued for complete immunity for third parties dealing
with a trustee.
In 1974, Professor Fratcher adhered the chapter on Trusts in the INT'L
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW.

W. FRATCHER, Trusts, in IV INT'L

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (F. Lawson ed. 1972). In contrast to his 1962
article which downplays the significance of his no duty of inquiry and actual
knowledge proposal, the 1974 work highlights that the no duty of inquiry constitutes
a significant break with and improvement over other legislation and uniform laws
piotecting third parties dealing with trustees. In particular, Professor Fratcher clearly
points out that while the other legislation protecting third parties retains a duty of
inquiry where the third party has "knowledge that the transaction is for the individual
benefit of the trustee or otherwise in breach of the trust.... [T]he Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act... abolishes altogether the duty of third persons to inquire into trustees'
powers and the propriety of their exercise." Id. at 82-83. That Professor Fratcher
considers § 7 unique and important is brought home by the fact that Professor Fratcher
then sets forth the entire § 7 of the U.T.P.A. verbatim. Id. at 83. In his eighty-threepage discussion of the common law origins of and statutory modificationg to the
Anglo-American law of trusts, with hundreds of citations to over one hundred different
statutory modifications to the common law of trusts, § 7 of the U.T.P.A. is one of only
a handful of historic statutory provisions which he deemed worth setting forth in full.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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Just after singing the praises of § 7 with respect to its abolition of the duty of
inquiry, however, Professor Fratcher implicitly attacks § 7 and its actual knowledge
standard of liability by arguing rhetorically for complete immunity for third parties
dealing with a trustee:
It should be noted that the legislation just discussed, both BRITISH and
AMERICAN [the latter including cites to the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the
Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Act for the Simplification of
Fiduciary Security Transfers, and the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act],
relieves third persons of the duty of inquiry but preserves the rule that a
third person who participates with or assists a trustee in a transaction
involving a breach of trust, with notice of the breach, incurs virtually the
same liability to the beneficiary which the trustee is subject ....
[W]e are still left with the rule that a third person who deals with or assists
a trustee in a transaction with notice that it involves a breach of trust incurs
substantially the same liability for the breach as the trustee himself. Is this
a desirable rule? Lability (sic) is not imposed on one who sells a mink coat
to a married man merely because he has notice that the purchaser intends
to give it to his mistress. Liability is not imposed on one who buys a house
from a corporation merely because he has notice that the corporation plans
to pay excessive salaries to its officers. Liability is not imposed on one
who buys an automobile from a dealer merely because he has notice that
the seller does not plan to pay his income tax. If persons who deal with
trustees are subject to liabilitieswhich would not arise in the absence of a
trust, the ability of trustees to persuade others to deal with them on
advantageousterms and, hence, to manage the trustproperty as a prudent
man would his own, is impaired. To the extent that this ability is impaired,
all trust beneficiaries are injured. The settlor of a trust entrusts the trustee
with legal ownership of the trust property because he considers him
trustworthy. In most cases he is. Is the protectionafforded trust beneficiaries by the rule that third persons who deal with a trustee are, in effect,
guarantorsof the trustees' prudence and fidelity, worth its cost in terms of
impairing the efficiency of trust administration?
Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
The quoted material is significant for two reasons. First, the opening sentence
of the quoted material implicitly lumps together the broad common law notice standard
with both the other uniform laws' good faith standard and the U.T.P.A.'s actual
knowledge standard. Could it be that Professor Fratcher viewed the increased
protection afforded the third parties by the respective uniform laws, be it the good faith
standard or the actual knowledge standard, as indistinguishable from the common law
notice standard? While Professor Fratcher specifically notes and emphasizes that the
other uniform laws have relieved third parties of the broad common law duty of
inquiry and impose the duty of inquiry only in limited circumstances, he fails
specifically even to note the fact that the other uniform laws have rejected the broad
notice component of the common law bona fide purchaser requirement in favor of a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Moreover, the manner in which Professor Fratcher's article presents the
no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge proposal minimizes the chances that
one reading the proposal would realize that the no duty of inquiry and actual
knowledge standard is a departure from the other prevailing uniform laws.
The no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge proposal is juxtaposed with: (1)
Professor Fratcher's discussion of the evils of the broad common law duty of
inquiry based simply upon notice that one is dealing with a trustee, and (2)
Professor Fratcher's discussion of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code. The juxtaposition implies: (1) that the complete
termination of the duty of inquiry logically flows from the repudiation of the
broad common law duty of inquiry, and (2) that the Uniform Fiduciaries Act
and the Uniform Commercial Code have adopted the actual knowledge
standard. 95 There are problems, however, with respect to both implications.

more limited good faith standard. This treatment of the other uniform laws is
particularly confusing in light of the fact that in discussing the English statutes which
grant protection to third parties dealing with a trustee, Professor Fratcher repeatedly
notes that the English statutes require the third party to be acting in good faith. Id. at
81-82. Why Professor Fratcher fails to distinguish among the broad common law
notice standard, the prevailing uniform law good faith standard, and the U.T.P.A.'s
actual knowledge standard is unclear.
If Professor Fratcher actually believed that there is no significant difference
among the standards, that may explain his failure to discuss his actual knowledge
standard in his 1962 proposal. This explanation, however, creates only greater
confusion with respect to how § 7 of the U.T.P.A. should be interpreted, and further
supports the position that the Special Committee responsible for drafting § 7 may have
believed that it contained the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements.
In the alternative, Professor Fratcher may not have distinguished among the
different standards because he believed that there is no reason to distinguish among
them. Any standard of liability short of complete immunity is inefficient in terms of
trust administration and therefore is unacceptable if one accepts maximizing trust
administration efficiency as the ultimate goal. Just as the trustee should be free to deal
with the trust property as he or she would their own-as if there were no trust or trust
beneficiaries at all-third parties should be free to deal with the trustee and trust
property as if there were no trust or trust beneficiaries at all. If Professor Fratcher did
not hold this position in 1962 when he proposed the trustees' powers legislation, he
certainly held it not too long thereafter. On the other hand, if Professor Fratcher held
this position in 1962, one can assume only that his actual knowledge proposal
constituted a compromise which he thought would be more acceptable than the more
controversial and noticeable complete immunity standard.
95. While the proposal's presentation implies these conclusions, the proposal does
not to state that such is the case.
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In particular, with respect to the duty of inquiry, the proposal focuses the
reader's attention on the apparent inconsistency between abolishing the duty
of inquiry for one who purchases a million dollars in corporate bonds from a
trustee while imposing the duty of inquiry where one purchases a pig or
rocking chair at a trustee's auction. 96 The article then asks the obvious
question: "Might it not be better to eliminate the duty of inquiry in all
transactions

.. ?"97

That both situations should be treated the same follows

logically from the apparent inconsistency in the two transactions with respect
to the duty of inquiry; 98 the problem is that the apparent inconsistency is not
a completely accurate statement of the law. Although a third party purchasing
corporate bonds from a trustee need not inquire into the trustees' powers
simply because the third party is dealing with a trustee, a third party
purchasing corporate bonds must inquire into the trustees' powers if the third
party has knowledge that the transaction is for the personal benefit of the
trustee or otherwise in breach of trust. 99 Moreover, one purchasing corporate
bonds from a trustee must be acting in good faith,1'0 with good faith defined
as the absence of bad faith.' 0 ' Although bad faith is not expressly defined
in terms of the duty of inquiry, bad faith evolved out of the notice component
of the common law bona fide purchaser requirement and inherently contains

96. Fratcher, supra note 75, at 662.
97. Id. at 662-63.
98. Although one could argue there is a meaningful difference in the transactions
in the nature of the transactions, the commercial paper and investment securities
covered by the U.C.C. are unique commodities that require special treatment. The
same is true of the negotiable instruments covered by the U.F.A.

A modern

investment-oriented society needs to be able to act quickly and dependably with respect
to such commodities. The same is not necessarily true, or at the least not to the same
degree, with respect to the purchase of a pig or rocking chair at a trustee's auction.
99. The transfer of corporate bonds is regulated by the U.C.C. Which provision
of the Code governs depends on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the bond.
"[A] bond in bearer form which is a negotiable instrument and governed by Article 3
could become an investment security [governed by Article 8] if it is one of a series
and is traded on an exchange." E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 259
F. Supp. 513, 517 (E.D. Mich. 1966). Regardless of which article governs, both
articles require a limited duty of inquiry where the party "has knowledge that a
fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security for his own debt

or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty." U.C.C. § 3304 (1977); accord U.C.C. § 8-304 (1977).

100. U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 8-302 (1977).
101. Riley v. First State Bank, Spearman, 469 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Ct. App.
1971); accord U.F.A. § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 395, 399-400 (1990) (citing cases defining
bad faith as the antonym of good faith); see also Davis v. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins.
on Lives and Granting Annuities, 337 Pa. 456, 459, 12 A.2d 66, 68 (1940).
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Accordingly, to say that one purchasing corporate

bonds from a trustee need not inquire into the trustees' powers overstates the
standard of protection accorded third parties under the Uniform Commercial
Code. 0 3 Therefore, the question, "Might it not be better to eliminate the
duty of inquiry in all transactions with trustees ... ?" really does not follow
at all from the discussion preceding it. Although the unsuspecting reader
interprets the foregoing question to mean: "Might it not be better to treat both
of these situations the same . . . ?", in fact the proposal asks a completely
different question: "Might it not be better to eliminate the duty of inquiry in

102. Bad faith is tantamount to the common law's bad faith constructive
knowledge. See Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Toronto-Dominion Band, 533
F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also supra note 69. The official comments to the
U.F.A. make it clear that the concept of bad faith relates directly to the issue of a third
party's duty to inquire as to the propriety of the transaction. The official comments
provide that absent knowledge that the transaction if for the personal benefit of the
fiduciary, the
presumption should be that the transaction is proper and the presumption
should be' rebutted only by proof of actual knowledge that it is improper,
or proof of bad faith. The taker should be liable not only where he has
actual knowledge that the fiduciary is acting improperly but also where he
acts in bad faith, as for example, where he suspects that the fiduciary is
acting improperly and deliberately refrains from investigating in order that
he may avoid knowledge that the fiduciary is acting improperly. The test
however should not be the objective test of negligence but the subjective
test of bad faith.
U.F.A. § 6 comment, 7A U.L.A. 410-11 (1990).
103. Although the proposal does not expressly cite the Uniform Act for
Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfer, it could also apply to the purchase of
corporate bonds. The Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfer

provides expressly for complete protection and for no duty of inquiry under any
circumstances for a corporation and transfer agent involved in the transfer of stock
held by a fiduciary. The Act also affects third parties who participatein the transfer.
The Act provides expressly that these third parties are not
liable for participation in a breach of fiduciary duty by reason of failure to
inquire into whether the transaction involves a breach unless it is shown
that he acted with actual knowledge that the proceeds of the transaction
were being used for the individual benefit of the fiduciary or that the
transactionwas otherwise in breach of duty.
UNIFORM ACr FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY TRANSFER Acr, 7B U.L.A. 35

(1990) (emphasis added).
The prefatory notes and history to the Act indicate that the Act was intended to protect
the parties involved in the process necessary to transfer the security, but not the
ultimate purchaser of the security. See UNIFORM Acr FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF
FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFER PREFATORY NOTE, 7B U.L.A. 690-93; A. Scor,
ParticipationinBreachof Trust, in 1958 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 1114, 1114-16 (1958).
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all transactions... ?" Despite the impression created that the elimination of
the duty in all transactions follows logically from the fact that the duty had
already been eliminated in some transactions, in reality the duty of inquiry had
not been completely eliminated in any transaction for any third party dealing
with a trustee. 10' The complete elimination of the duty of inquiry for all
third parties dealing with a trustee constituted a completely new and
significant development in the law of trusts. Inasmuch 'as Professor Fratcher
himself carefully noted that the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code had not completely eliminated the duty of inquiry in all
10 5
transactions concerning negotiable instruments and investment securities,
one would have expected more of an explanation of why he proposed the
complete elimination of the duty in all other transactions involving a trustee.
Just as juxtaposing the discussion of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the
Uniform Commercial Code with the proposal for no duty of inquiry implies
that these other uniform laws had adopted the no duty of inquiry standard,
juxtaposing the actual knowledge standard right after the no duty of inquiry
proposal likewise implies that these other uniform laws had adopted the actual
knowledge standard. This implication is reinforced by Professor Fratcher's
earlier discussion of the general common law rules governing third parties
transacting with trustees, and by his discussion of the other legislative
measures which had modified the common law rules and accorded greater
protection to third parties dealing with a trustee. In defining and discussing
the common law bona fide purchaser rule, Professor Fratcher does not
expressly include a reference to the requirement that the third party be acting
in good faith. 1' 6 In discussing the other statutory modifications of the
common law bona fide purchaser rule, Professor Fratcher discusses a number
of changes effected by the different state and uniform laws, but conspicuously
absent is any discussion of the good faith requirement.0 7 Despite repeated
references and citations to the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code, not once does the article acknowledge the good faith
requirement of these other uniform laws.'08 Accordingly, when the actual
knowledge proposal follows the discussion of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code, the implication is that these uniform laws
adopt the actual knowledge standard. As noted above, however, this is not the
case. Both the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
require good faith.'0 9 Inasmuch as both the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the

104. See UNIFORM PREFATORY NOTE, supra note 103, at 690-93.

105. Fratcher, supra note 75, at 662.
106. Id. at 645.

107. Id. at 647-49.
108. Id. at 648-49.
109. Supra note 6.
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Uniform Commercial Code retain the good faith requirement, one would
expect more of an explanation of why Professor Fratcher rejected the good
faith requirement in favor of the actual knowledge standard.
This historical examination of section seven of the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act produces a rather interesting conclusion: although the express
language of section seven is clear and unambiguous, when evaluated in light
of its legislative background section seven is anything but clear and unambiguous. While the Uniform Law Commission clearly intended to reject the
broad common law duty of inquiry and bona fide purchaser requirements,
there is no evidence that the Commission intended to reject the limited duty
of inquiry and good faith requirements prevailing in the other uniform laws
addressing the liability of third parties dealing with a fiduciary. Moreover, the
only comments attributable to the Commission indicate that the Commission
thought that section seven contained the limited duty of inquiry and good faith
requirements. The latent ambiguity in section seven apparently stems from the
Commission's blind acceptance of Professor Fratcher's 1962 proposal that the
appropriate standard of liability for third parties dealing with a trustee should
be an actual knowledge with absolutely no duty of inquiry standard. The
Commission's blind acceptance of this proposal would be forgivable if
Professor Fratcher's proposal contained a thorough analysis and justification
for this standard of liability. Unfortunately, Professor Fratcher's proposal
contained no such analysis. The Commission's blind acceptance of Professor
Fratcher's proposal may be forgivable, however, for another reason: Professor
Fratcher's third party liability proposal is presented so cryptically, one may
forgive the Commission for not realizing the significance of the actual
knowledge with no duty of inquiry standard. Why Professor Fratcher
presented his proposal so cryptically is unclear, but the conclusion that the
Commission failed to realize the significance of the proposal is clear. There
is no evidence that the Uniform Law Commission knowingly and consciously
rejected the prevailing limited duty of inquiry and good faith standard
contained in the other uniform laws addressing the liability of third parties
dealing with a fiduciary.
The historical background of section seven is not only interesting in its
own right, but it also has current relevance. At first glance, this claim of
current relevance may seem a bit strange. The Uniform Law Commission
adopted and promulgated the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in 1964."0 The
Act has been adopted in 16 states... and there is no evidence that the actual

110. 1964 HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 96.
111. As of July 1, 1990 the following states had adopted the U.T.P.A.: Arizona,
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-7231 to -7237 (1989); California, CAL. PROB. CODE §

18,100 (West 1990); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 737.401-.407 (West 1990); Hawaii,
HAw. REv. STAT. § 554A-7 (1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 68-104 to -113 (1989);
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knowledge with no duty of inquiry standard has been problematic; there has
been no outcry for revision of the provision. But just as the apparent clarity
of section seven belies its latent ambiguity, the apparent success of section
seven belies its latent ineffectiveness.
III. ANALYTICAL CRITIQUE OF SECTION SEVEN
OF THE UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT

A. The Conflict Between Section Seven
of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act
and the CorrespondingProvisions
of the Other Uniform Laws
Renders Section Seven Ineffective
The latent ineffectiveness of section seven of the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act stems from the fact that section seven not only differs from the
corresponding provisions of the other uniform laws, but also overlaps with the
conflicting corresponding provisions to a degree. Faced with this conflict and
the resulting uncertainty over which standard governs, third parties interested
in dealing with a trustee no doubt conform their conduct to the higher
standard of the other uniform laws." 2 The net result is that section seven
of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act is ineffective in terms of affecting the
dealings between third parties and trustees.
By way of example, what if a third party is interested in purchasing a
negotiable instrument from a trustee, but the third party has actual knowledge
of facts which raise a strong suspicion in the third party's mind that the sale
is in breach of the trustee's fiduciary obligations. The trustee, however, is
offering the negotiable instrument at such an attractive price, the third party
decides not to inquire further into the propriety of the transaction for fear of

Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-1201 to -1211 (1983); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 386.800-.840 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, §§ 7-401 to -407 (1964); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-9-101 to -9-119
(1972); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.560 (1986); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§
72-21-101 to -21-206 (1989) (repealed 1989); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2819
to -2826 (1989); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564-A:1 to -A:11 (1974);

Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 128.003 to -.051 (1989); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-7401 to -7-408 (1953); and Wyoming, WYo. STAT. §§ 4-8-101 to -8-111 (1982).
California has modified § 7 of the U.T.P.A. to include a requirement that the
third party act in good faith. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 18,100 (West 1990).
112. To date there are no cases addressing or even acknowledging either the latent
ambiguity in § 7 of the U.T.P.A. or the conflict between § 7 and the corresponding
provisions of the U.C.C. and the U.F.A.
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acquiring actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust.
If the third party purchases the instrument, and the transaction in fact
constitutes a breach of trust by the trustee, which uniform law governs the
liability of the third party: the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, because the
third party is dealing with a trustee, or the Uniform Commercial Code, article
3, because the transaction involves the transfer of a negotiable instrument?
What if a bank has actual knowledge of facts which raise a strong
suspicion in the bank's mind that a trustee may be misappropriating trust
funds in breach of the trustee's fiduciary obligations. The bank does not want
to inquire into the propriety of the trustee's use of the withdrawn funds,
however, because the bank also suspects that the trustee is using the
withdrawn funds to repay a personal debt of the trustee to the bank. If it turns
out that in fact the trustee was misappropriating the trust funds in breach of
trustee's obligations, which uniform law governs the liability of the bank: the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, because the bank is dealing with a trustee, or
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, because the transaction involves a deposit
account in the name of a fiduciary as such?
What if a third party is interested in purchasing an investment security
from a trustee, but the third party has actual knowledge of facts which raise
a strong suspicion in the third party's mind that the sale is in breach of the
trustee's fiduciary obligations. The trustee, however, is offering the
investment security at such an attractive price, the third party decides not to
inquire further into the propriety of the transaction for fear of acquiring actual
knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust. If the third party
purchases the security, and the transaction in fact constitutes a breach of trust
by the trustee, which uniform law governs the liability of the third party: the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, because the third party is dealing with a
trustee, or the Uniform Commercial Code, article 8, because the transaction
involves the transfer of an investment security?
At common law, there is no doubt that in each of the above hypotheticals" 3 the third party dealing with the trustee is liable for participating in
the breach of trust. In each hypothetical the third party knows it is dealing
with a trustee and the broad common law duty of inquiry charges the third
party with knowledge of the information that it would have obtained if it had
114
conducted a reasonably diligent inquiry into the trustee's powers.
Assuming that such an inquiry would reveal that the proposed transaction

113. The three hypotheticals will be dealt with collectively. Accordingly, the
subsequent references to the "third party" refers to the third party interested in
purchasing the negotiable instrument, the bank interested in paying trust funds to the
trustee, and the third party interested in purchasing the investment security.
114. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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constituted a breach of trust, the third party is liable for participating in the
breach of trust.
Under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial Code,
the third party in each of the above hypotheticals would still be liable for
participating in the breach of trust. Under both the Uniform Fiduciaries Act
and the Uniform Commercial Code, the third party's suspicions about the
transaction in each hypothetical coupled with the party's conscious decision
not to inquire further in the hope of avoiding actual knowledge that the
transaction constituted a breach of trust constitute bad faith." 5 Based upon
the good faith requirement contained in both the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code, the third party would be liable for participating in the breach of trust.11 6 Moreover, although neither the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act nor the Uniform Commercial Code contains a general duty of
inquiry simply because the third party knows it is dealing with a trustee, the
third party has a limited duty of inquiry if the transaction is prima facie
wrongful. 7 Under the limited duty of inquiry retained by both the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, the third party may have
a duty to inquire, and, if so, the third party, is chargeable with knowledge of
the information that the third party would have obtained if it had conducted
a reasonably diligent inquiry into the trustees' powers." 8 Assuming that the
inquiry would reveal that the proposed transaction constitutes a breach of trust,
the third party failure to inquire may provide an additional basis upon which

to impose liability for participating in the breach of trust.
Under the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, however, the third party in
each of the hypotheticals would not be liable for participating in the breach
of trust. Even if the third party knows that the trustee is benefitting
individually from the transaction, the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act imposes
absolutely no duty of inquiry under any circumstances. 9 Even though in
each hypothetical the third party strongly suspects that there is something
wrong with the transaction and consciously shields its eyes to avoid acquiring
damaging information, the third party does not have actual knowledge that the
transaction constitutes a breach of trust. Absent actual knowledge, the third
party can go through with the transaction with confidence that it has no
liability exposure.

115. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-304, 8-302, 8-204 (1977);U.F.A. § 5,2 U.L.A. 176,213,
2A U.L.A. 534, 540, 7B U.L.A. 406-07 (1990); see also supra notes 27-28.
118. Id.
119. U.T.P.A. § 7, 7A U.L.A. 758 (1990).
120. Id.
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This confidence, however, is undermined by the fact that every state
which has adopted the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act has adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code, and a number of the states which have adopted the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act have adopted both the Uniform Commercial
Inasmuch as the conflicting
Code and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.1
statutory provisions overlap and apply to the same situation,' a third party
interested in dealing with a trustee is faced with the dilemma of trying to
figure out which of the conflicting standards of liability controls.' 3 In the

121. For the citations to each state's U.T.P.A., see supra note 111. The
corresponding citations for each state's U.C.C. provisions are: Arizona, ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47-1101 to -11107 (1956); California, CAL. COM. CODE §§ 110115,104 (West 1964); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 671.101-.111 (West 1990); Hawaii,
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 490:1-101 to :11-108 (1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 28-1-101
to -10-104 (1980); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-1-101 to -10-102 (1983);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 355.1-101 to -108 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987);
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1-101 to 10-108 (1964 & Supp. 1990);
Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -11-108 (1972); Missouri, Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 400.1-101 to .11-107 (1986); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-101 to 9-511 (1989); Nebraska, NEB. U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1980); New Hampshire,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382-A:1-101 to :9-507 (1961); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§
71.1010-.6010 (1989); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70A-1-101 to -11-108 (1953); and
Wyoming, WYo. STAT. §§ 34.1-1-101 to -10-104 (1972). Corresponding citations for
the U.F.A. provisions are: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-7501 to -7512
(1956); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 556:1-:10 (1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 68-301
to -315 (1989); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 456.240-.350 (1986); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 22-1-1 to -1-11 (1953); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. §§ 2-3-201 to -3-211
(1977).
122. It should be noted that there are a number of transactions (those not
involving commercial paper, negotiable instruments or investment securities) which do
not fall within the scope of all three uniform laws. By way of example, in the
hypothetical which opened this Article (the trustee of a charitable foundation offered
to make two $1,000,000 donations to a not-for-profit organization if the organization
would use one of the donations to purchase a residence and deed it back to the
foundation), if the trustee were to use cash, only the U.T.P.A. would apply. The use
of cash, however, would only heighten one's suspicions that the trustee may be
breaching its fiduciary obligations, increasing the probability that any failure to inquire
would be a bad faith failure to inquire. Under the U.T.P.A., however, bad faith is
irrelevant. This variation on the opening example shows (1) the obvious inequities of
protecting third parties who act in bad faith, and (2) how the U.T.P.A.'s 'actual
knowledge' standard facilitates breaches of trust.
123. Arguments over which statutory provision should control can be advanced
on both sides of the issue. On the one hand, the not-for-profit organization could
argue that the U.T.P.A. should control. The Act specifically addresses that issue of
the liability of third parties dealing with a trustee, while the other uniform laws address
the liability of third parties dealing with a fiduciary generally. The Act was drafted
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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face of clear conflict between the traditional good faith standard and the
unusually broad actual knowledge standard contained in section seven, the
lack of a clear legislative explanation behind section seven creates sufficient
uncertainty to undermine the effectiveness of section seven. Faced with the
conflict and uncertainty over which standard of liability governs third parties
dealing with a trustee, the prudent and honest third parties no doubt adhere to
the higher standard imposed by the other uniform laws, thereby minimizing
the risks of liability and the costs associated with resolving the uncertainty
over the governing standard of liability. Accordingly, for the vast majority of
third parties, and hence for the vast majority of trustees' transactions, section
seven is completely ineffective.
Therefore, even if the Special Committee responsible for drafting section
seven actually intended to terminate completely the duty of inquiry and good

faith requirements, absent a stronger legislative statement that the Committee
actually intended that result, the vast majority of third parties will still adhere
to the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements. If, on the other
hand, the Special Committee actually thought that section seven contained the
good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements, then section seven should
be amended to express clearly those requirements.
As matters currently stand then, section seven silently cries out for
clarification. Although section seven appears to be clear and straightforward
when read in isolation, when read in light of the corresponding provisions of
the other uniform laws addressing the liability of third parties dealing with a
fiduciary and in light of the realization that such provisions overlap, the
conflict among the laws is obvious. Such conflict within the uniform law

and adopted against the backdrop of the other uniform laws and the language of § 7
clearly and unambiguously rejects any duty of inquiry and imposes liability only if the
third party has actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust. It
should be assumed that the Uniform Law Commission knew the standard of liability
imposed by the other uniform laws and implicitly rejected them in adopting § 7.
Moreover, application of § 7's actual knowledge standard furthers the purpose of the
U.T.P.A.-to maximize trust administration efficiency. On the other hand, inasmuch
as the legislative history behind § 7 is at best confusing, and arguably indicates that
the Special Committee responsible for drafting the section thought the section
contained a limited duty of inquiry and good faith requirement, it is doubtful that any
court would apply § 7 over one of the other uniform law provisions governing third
party liability for participating in a breach of trust. Application of § 7 over the other
the other uniform law provisions governing the liability of third parties dealing with
a trustee would result in the death of the long standing principles of equity that third
parties have at least a limited duty of inquiry and duty to act in good faith when
dealing with a trustee. Such a significant change in the law should not be enforced
without greater evidence that such a change was actually intended by the drafters of
§ 7.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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system and the uncertainty the conflict creates is the antithesis of the uniform
law philosophy. 24 In resolving the conflict, the obvious question is which
standard of liability should govern third parties dealing with a trustee: (1) the
limited duty of inquiry coupled with a good faith standard; (2) the actual
knowledge with absolutely no duty of inquiry standard; or (3) the complete
immunity standard?1' 2
B. Any Re-Examination of the Appropriate Standardof
Liabilityfor Third PartiesInterested in Dealing with
a Trustee Should Begin with the Presumption that the
Appropriate Standard is the Good Faith and Limited Duty
of Inquiry Standard
Although a thorough analysis of the issue of the appropriate standard of
liability for third parties dealing with a trustee exceeds the scope of this
article, a few preliminary observations are in order. First of all, of the three
possible standards, the most logical choice is the limited duty of inquiry and
good faith standard.
Professor Fratcher was not the first to realize the tension between the
conservative common law rules governing the liability of third parties dealing
with a fiduciary and the economic necessities of the modern day investmentoriented society, nor was the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act the first statutory
modification of the conservative common law rules governing the liability of
third parties dealing with a fiduciary. A plethora of other uniform laws have

rejected the broad common law duty of inquiry and bona fide purchaser
concept, and the broad liability which flowed from these requirements, yet
these laws have retained the good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements. 26 One of the earliest of such uniform laws, the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act, evolved out of Professor Scott's 1921 comprehensive and famous article,
Participation in a Breach of Trust. 27 In that article, Professor Scott
thoroughly examines the inequities and economic inefficiencies of the

124. See generally MacChesney, Uniform State Laws-A Means to Efficiency
Consistent with Democracy, 91 CENT. L. J. 297 (1920); Brewster, The Promotion of
Uniform Legislation, 6 YALE L. J. 132 (1897).
125. See supra note 94.
126. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT §§ 52, 26 (1896) (superseded by the
Uniform Commercial Code); U.F.A. §§ 4-9, 7A U.L.A. 405-17 (1990); U.C.C. §§ 3302,3-304 (1977); U.C.C. §§ 8-302,8-304 (1977); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

ACT §§ 3, 4, 7A U.L.A. 448, 474 (1990); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(a),
7A U.L.A. 662 (1984); BANKRUPTCY CODE § 548 (1990) (all of these acts requiring
that the party give valuable consideration).
127. Scott, Participationin a Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L. REV. 454 (1921).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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common law rules governing the liability of third parties dealing with a
fiduciary and the economic necessities of the modern day negotiable
instruments and commercial paper. 12 Professor Scott not only acknowledges but expressly endorses the limited duty of inquiry where the transaction is
prima facie wrongful." 9 Moreover, Professor Scott implicitly argues for a
good faith requirement when he repeatedly argues for no liability "in the
knowledge of the breach of trust or conduct amounting to
absence of1 3actual
0
bad faith.
The good faith'and limited duty of inquiry requirements are well-accepted
because they accord with one's sense of what is equitable and fair. Where a
party suspects a transaction is wrongful, the party should not be able to
intentionally shield its eyes and cover its ears to avoid actual knowledge that
the transaction is wrongful. Where a transaction is primafacie wrongful, and
a third party goes through with the transaction without investigating its
propriety, the innocent third party's position is equitably inferior to that of the
damaged party."' Moreover, where a transaction is not prima facie wrongful, but the third party has actual notice that the transaction is potentially
wrongful and intentionally fails to investigate in hopes of avoiding actual
knowledge that the transaction is wrongful, the third party's position is
These principles were
equitably inferior to that of the damaged party.
well-accepted at common law and are expressed in the good faith and limited
duty of inquiry requirements which are the statutory norm even where
economic considerations have mandated revision of the common law rules.
In light of these equitable principles, and for the sake of consistency and
uniformity, any analysis of the appropriate standard of liability for third parties
dealing with a trustee should begin with the presumption that the33 good faith
and limited duty of inquiry standard is the appropriate standard.
No doubt Professor Fratcher knew that the prevailing statutory norm was
the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard, yet he first rejected it in
favor of the actual knowledge with no duty of inquiry standard, and later the
complete immunity with no duty of inquiry standard. Why he rejected the

128. Id.
129. Id. at 456-57, 481.

130. Id. at 482.
131. This conclusion flows from the equitable principle that "he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands" and is based upon the third parties' lack of good
faith. See 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 15, §§ 397-404, 687-88.
132. Id.
133. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a strong argument can be made
that any analysis of the appropriate standard of liability for third parties dealing with
a trustee should also begin with the presumption that the third party should be required
to give value. See supra notes 4, 13, 126.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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good faith and limited duty of inquiry requirements is unclear, but he appears
to have rejected them for two reasons: (1) to maximize trust administration
efficiency,134 and (2) to avoid the unfair holding in King v. Richardson.
King held a third party acting in good faith liable for participating in a breach
of trust because the third party had actual knowledge of the terms of the trust.
The court held the correct interpretation of the terms was a question of law to
which the good faith conduct of the third party was irrelevant.135 Both of
these concerns, however, are adequately addressed under the good faith and
limited duty of inquiry standard.
C. The Good Faith and Limited Duty of Inquiry Standard of
Liability Maximizes Trust AdministrationEfficiency
While Protectingthe Interests of the Trust
Beneficiaries
Professor Fratcher has persuasively argued that in selecting the standard
of liability for third parties dealing with a trustee, one has to remember that
the standard of liability directly affects a third party's willingness to transact
with a trustee, which directly affects trust administration efficiency.'36 In
particular, Professor Fratcher asks: "Is the protection afforded trust beneficiaries by the rule that third persons who deal with a trustee are, in effect,
guarantors of the trustees' prudence and fidelity, worth its cost in terms of
impairing the efficiency of trust administration?" 37 Professor Fratcher's
question implicitly asserts two points: (1) that the rules of liability for third
parties dealing with a trustee make the third parties "guarantors of the trustees'
prudence and fidelity;" and (2) that the rules of liability for third parties
dealing with a trustee are not "worth their costs in terms of impairing the
efficiency of trust administration." While both of these points are true with
respect to the common law rules of liability, these points do not apply to the
good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard of liability.
It is true that at common law third parties are "in effect, guarantors of the
trustees' prudence and fidelity" and the common law rules of liability are not
"worth their costs in terms of impairing the efficiency of trust administration."
The broad common law duty of inquiry imposes upon third parties the duty
to inquire diligently into the trustees' powers to enter into the proposed
transaction. No doubt such an inquiry usually should reveal whether the
trustee has the requisite authority. Accordingly, in the event the transaction
134. Fratcher, supra note 75, at 658, 662; Fratcher, supra note 94, at 83.
135. Fratcher, supranote 75, at 658 (citing King v. Richardson, 136 F.2d 849 (4th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943)).
136. Id.
137. Fratcher, supra note 94, at 83.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7
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constitutes a breach of trust, for all practical purposes the broad common law
duty of inquiry imputes knowledge of the breach to the third party simply
because the third party is dealing with a trustee. 138 At common law, then,
the third parties are "in effect, guarantors of the trustees' prudence and
fidelity." Moreover, this guarantee arguably is not worth its cost in terms of
administration efficiency. The guarantee's broad liability exposure applies to
all transactions where the third party knows or should know that it is dealing
with a trustee, not just those where the third party suspects that the transaction
may be in breach of trust. This broad exposure no doubt deters some third
parties from transacting with trustees, and for those remaining third parties
who are willing to transact with trustees, the duty of diligent inquiry
significantly increases the transaction costs. The reduced market and
increased transaction costs significantly impair trust administration efficiency
by depressing the prices trustees can obtain for trust property and by
increasing the transaction costs third parties pass on to trustees. As between
the broad common law rules of liability and Professor Fratcher's complete
immunity standard, a strong case can be made that the broad common law
standard is not worth its cost in terms of trust administration efficiency. But
an equally strong case can be made that as between the complete immunity
standard and the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard, the complete
immunity standard is not worth its cost.
Unlike the broad common law rules, the good faith and limited duty of
inquiry standard does not make third parties dealing with a trustee "guarantors
of the trustees' prudence and fidelity." In the event the transaction constitutes
a breach of trust, the third parties are liable only in very limited circumstances: (1) where the third parties know that the transaction is for the personal
benefit of the trustee or is otherwise in breach of the trustee's obligations and
fail to inquire as to the propriety of the transaction, or (2) where the third
parties act in bad faith (that is, intentionally fail to ask questions in the hope
of avoiding knowledge that the transaction constitute a breach of trust).139
In both of these limited instances, the third parties are not guarantors of the
trustees' prudence and fidelity, but rather only of their own prudence and
fidelity.
Nor does the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard impair trust

administration efficiency. While any standard of liability short of complete
immunity obviously will result in some degree of "cost" to trust administration, there is no way of measuring the exact cost. Rather the process is one
of evaluating the assumed magnitude of the cost. While the magnitude of the
cost of the broad common law duty of inquiry is relatively high, the cost of
the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard is relatively low. The

138. See supra notes 3-4, 19-21.

139. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
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relatively low cost of the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard is
evidenced by the fact that both the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code adopted the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard
as their low cost alternative to the unduly burdensome costs associated with
the common law rules.14 ° The limited duty of inquiry and good faith
requirements have worked well in these other uniform laws; there is no
evidence that the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard imposes any
appreciable cost on the regulated transactions."' That the good faith and
limited duty of inquiry standard would likewise impose no appreciable costs
on trust administration efficiency is evidenced by the fact that for all practical
purposes the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard has in practice
been the governing standard for the vast majority of trust transactions 4 2 and
there is no evidence that this standard has in any way impaired trust
administration efficiency.
Furthermore, the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard passes
Professor Fratcher's own test for evaluating trust administration efficiency.
Professor Fratcher argued that
[i]f persons who deal with trustees are subjected to liabilities which would
not arise in the absence of a trust, the ability of the trustees to persuade
others to deal with them on advantageous terms, and, hence, to manage the
trust property as a prudent man would his own, is impaired) 43
Again, while this argument is true as applied to the broad common law duty
of inquiry, the argument does not apply to the good faith and limited duty of
inquiry standard. At common law, the broad duty of inquiry requires third
parties dealing with a trustee to inquire into the trustees' power to engage in
the transaction simply because the third parties' knowledge that they were
dealing with a trustee puts them on notice of the trust relationship and hence
the potentially adverse interest of the trust beneficiaries. 4 4 The duty to
inquire applies even in the absence of any facts indicating that the transaction
may be wrongful.145 To that degree, at common law third parties dealing
with a trustee are subject to liabilities which do not apply in the absence of
the trust situation. But the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard

140. See id.; see also Scott, supra note 127, at 454.
141. Moreover, a strong case can be made that the need for transaction protection
and efficiency is even greater in the negotiable instruments and commercial paper areas

than in the area of trust administration. See supra note 98.
142. See supra note 112.
143. Fratcher, supra note 94, at 83.
144. Supra notes 18-19.

145. Id.; see ahso Scott, supra note 127, at 458.
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rejects the broad common law duty of inquiry. The good faith and limited
duty of inquiry standard does not subject third parties to "liabilities which
would not arise in the absence of a trust." The Uniform Fiduciaries Act
applies the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard not only to trusts
but to other fiduciary relationships. 46 The Uniform Commercial Code
applies the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard to all transactions
involving negotiable instruments and investment securities, not just those
involving fiduciaries. 47

Moreover, although the limited duty of inquiry is

not always an express requirement, the good faith requirement is applied
across the board to a whole host of transactions without regard to the presence
of a trust relationship by a number of other uniform laws. 4 8 Subjecting
third parties to liabilities based upon the third parties' bad faith is not
subjecting the third parties to liabilities which would not arise in the absence
of a trust. On the other hand, granting third parties who deal with a trustee
complete immunity (or even immunity absent actual knowledge) would be
providing third parties with a degree of protection which would not be
available but for the presence of the trust. Such protection is unnecessary.
Professor Fratcher also argues that trust beneficiaries can be adequately
protected under the complete immunity with no duty of inquiry standard by
requiring trustees to be bonded. The bond requirement is itself an expense
that trustees will pass back to the trust in the form of greater trustees' fees.
Moreover, inasmuch as the complete immunity standard facilitates breaches
of trust by trustees, 149 one would have to anticipate an increase in breaches
of trust, which in turn will result in an increase in claims by trust beneficiaries, which in turn will result in an increase in the cost of requiring trustees
to be bonded. The cost of posting bond will only increase as claims against
the trustees rise. Obviously there is a cost associated with requiring each
trustee to post bond, and it is far from clear, as Professor Fratcher apparently
assumes, that, in terms of impairing trust efficiency, the cost of bonding is
lower than the cost of the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard.
Finally, the complete immunity standard for which Professor Fratcher
argues is contrary to most people's notion of ethical conduct. Even Professor
Scott himself endorsed the general principles that where a transaction is prima

facie wrongful the third party has a duty to investigate the propriety of the

146. U.F.A. § 1, 7A U.L.A. 395 (1990).
147. U.C.C. arts. 3, 8 (1977).

148. Supra note 126.
149. The complete immunity standard, and for that matter, the actual knowledge
standard, facilitate breaches of trusts by trustees because it will be easier for the
trustees to find third parties willing to enter into transactions which constitute a breach
of trust. See supra note 122. This is particularly true of trustees of charitable trusts,
inasmuch as supervision of such trusts and trustees is already difficult enough.
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transaction, and where the third party has actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust or acts in bad faith, the third party should be
subject to liability.5
Such parties are not innocent third parties acting
honestly but rather culpable third parties who in essence have decided to join
in the breach of trust. It is well accepted that such parties should be held
liable for their culpable conduct. Repudiating rules which are well accepted
as inherently fair and equitable has a cost to a legal system, and such cost
should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis. Absent strong evidence that
the cost of imposing liability upon third parties who breach the good faith and
limited duty of inquiry standard far outweighs its worth in terms of the
efficiency of trust administration, such a rule should be preserved because of
its worth to the integrity of a legal system as a whole.
Considering all of the above factors, as between the complete immunity
with no duty of inquiry standard and the good faith and limited duty of
inquiry standard, the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard provides
greater protection to trust beneficiaries without appreciably affecting trust
administration efficiency.
D. The Good Faith and Limited Duty of Inquiry Standard
Protects Third Parties Who Honestly and in Good Faith
Misinterpretthe Terms of a Trust Instrument
The other principal reason Professor Fratcher apparently supports the
complete immunity standard is that such a standard is necessary to protect
innocent third persons who deal with a trustee with actual knowledge of the
terms of the trust. In particular,
Professor Fratcher's concern is based on the
15
case of King v. Richardson. 1
In King, the testator established a testamentary trust funded with 8/100
interest of the stock of a chemical corporation. 55' The testator gave the
8/100 interest to his wife for life, and upon her death, a remainder interest of
3/100 of the stock in the corporation to the Trustees of the First Presbyterian
Church, with the restriction that "the profits or dividends arising therefrom be
used by said Trustees for the benefit of Home and Foreign Missions and the
benevolent causes of the church, in such proportion as the trustees deem
best." 53 Shortly after the death of the testator, and while his widow was
still alive, the First Presbyterian Church undertook a campaign to raise funds
to erect a new church. 4 Unfortunately, the church was unable to raise the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Supra note 127.
136 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 777 (1943).
Id. at 853-54.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
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necessary funds. 55 The widow, who was anxious that the church raise the
necessary funds, proposed that the church sell its remainder interest in the
stock to her children, along with her life estate interest, with the proceeds
from the sale devoted to the campaign. 56 These
proceeds would give the
15 7
church sufficient assets to build the new church.
The sale went through as proposed, and the chemical corporation
transferred the shares in question from the trustees to the children. 58 Both
the children and the chemical corporation had actual knowledge of the terms
of the trust and claimed that they believed in good faith that the sale of the
stock to raise funds to build the new church was an authorized benevolent
cause within the directions of the trust. 159 The widow died 17 years later,
and at that time the officers of the Home and Foreign Missions began
inquiring into the status of the trust.' 6° When they learned of the sale and
prior use of the proceeds, the officers claimed that the sale of the stock and
the use of the proceeds to erect the new church constituted a breach of trust
and demanded that the trustees sue the purchasers of the stock, the children
and the corporation, as participants in the breach of trust.16 ' The court
imposed the common law bona fide purchaser requirement and held the
corporation and purchasers of the stock liable for participating in the trustees'
breach of trust.' 62 To be a bona fide purchaser, the third party had to be
acting in good faith and have no notice that the transaction constituted a
breach of trust. 6 3 The court reasoned that even though the third parties
were acting in good faith, their good faith was irrelevant.' 64 Inasmuch as
the third parties had notice of the terms of the trust, at common law they were
65
held to a proper interpretation of the terms of the trust.
Professor Fratcher takes issue with the fairness of the court's ruling, and
rightfully so. In criticizing the court's opinion, Professor Fratcher states:

They [the purchasers and the corporation] thought, honestly and in good
faith, that this was an authorized use of trust funds but liability was
imposed on them under a theory that, in contemplation of law, they knew

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855-56, 859.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 859-60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the proposed use was a breach of trust. This theory assumes, (1) because,
in Common Law litigation, the meaning of the language is determined by
the judge rather than the jury, it is a matter of law; (2) all persons are
bound to know the law and treated as if they did know it; (3) therefore, the
chemical corporation and the purchasers of the stock were liable as if they
had known that the trustees intended to divert the1 proceeds of the sale to a
purpose not authorized by the terms of the trust. 6
Fratcher uses the inequity of holding the honest third parties acting in good
faith liable to argue for the complete immunity standard:
It should be noted that the legislation just discussed, both British and
American [the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers and the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act], relieves third parties of the duty of inquiry
but preserves the rule that a third person who participates with or assists a
trustee in a transaction involving a breach of trust, with notice of the
breach, incurs virtually the same liability to the beneficiary to which the
trustee is subject. . . . Hence, it would not protect the innocent third
persons who were defendants in King v. Richardson. 67
Professor Fratcher's argument in favor of complete immunity is logical
enough: (1) it is inequitable and unfair to impose liability upon innocent third
parties dealing in good faith with a trustee but who have actual knowledge of
the terms of the trust; (2) none of the legislative acts protecting third parties
dealing with a fiduciary protect such innocent third parties;"6 therefore, (3)
the only way to protect such third parties is to accord all third parties dealing
with a trustee complete immunity. The problem with Professor Fratcher's
argument, however, is that the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard
does protect such third parties.
The innocent stock purchasers in King v. Richardson are protected under
the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard contained in the Uniform
Commercial Code. 69 At common law, for the third party to receive

166. Fratcher, supra note 94, at 83.
167. Id.
168. It should be noted that in King, the court applied the common laws rules in
finding the defendants liability, and did not even address the issue of whether any
legislative provisions may have protected the purchasers.
169. In addition to the protection available under the U.C.C., the Uniform Act for
Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers provides complete immunity to
corporations like the chemical corporation in King which are not per se parties to the
transaction but are rather simply transferring ownership of the securities sold by the

fiduciary.

UNIF.

AcT FOR SIMPLIFICATION

OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS §

6,

7B U.L.A. 700 (1990). In King, the Fourth Circuit held the corporate defendant liable
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/7

46

1991]

UNIFORM
POWERS
ACTand Inexplicably Broad
Wendel: Wendel:
Examining TRUSTEES'
the Mystery behind
the Unusually

property from the trustee free of trust and free of liability to the trust

beneficiaries, the third party had to be a bona fide purchaser. 170 To be a
bona fide purchaser, the third party had to be acting in good faith and have

no notice of an adverse claim in the property.17 ' At common law, good
faith alone was not enough to protect the third party because of the additional
requirement that the third party have no notice of any adverse claims.
Because the common law absence of notice requirement included absence of
negligent constructive notice, negligent third parties acting in good faith could
still be held liable for participating in a breach of trust. The Uniform
Commercial Code, however, expressly rejects the broad common law notice
concept in favor of the more limited duty of inquiry. 172 Moreover, the
Uniform Commercial Code expressly rejects the common law imposition of
liability based upon mere negligent constructive notice of the breach of trust
and instead requires actual knowledge of the breach of trust or bad faith.173

In criticizing the Fourth Circuit's holding in King imposing liability on
the stock purchaser, Professor Fratcher notes that liability was imposed "under
a theory that, in contemplation of law, they knew the proposed use was a

because at common law, if the corporation knewor should have known it was dealing
with a fiduciary, the corporation is subject to the same duty of inquiry and bona fide
purchaser requirements as are any other third party dealing with a fiduciary. King, 136
F.2d at 864-65. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit stated that the corporation, "in making
the transfer on its books was... chargeable with knowledge of the trust and that the
transfer was in violation thereof." Id. at 859. This common law rule was unique to
America, the English common law had never treated the corporation or transfer agent
as a party to the transaction simply because of their limited role in transferring
ownership of the stock. A. SCOTT,Participationin Breach of Trust, in 1958 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 1114, 1114-16 (1958). Section 6 of the Uniform Act for Simplification
of Fiduciary Security Transfers rejects the American common law position in favor of
the English position. The provision expressly disclaims liability for corporations and
transfer agents which simply transfer ownership of stock registered in the name of a
fiduciary. UNIF. Acr FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS § 6
(1990). The language is absolute, and the comments expressly provide that there is
no exception, even in cases of actual knowledge or bad faith. Id.; see also 7B U.L.A.
691-92 (1990). Applying § 6 of the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary
Security Transfers to the chemical corporation in King, the corporation would be
completely protected against liability based upon its making the transfer on its books.
Hence, the innocent corporation in King which merely registered the transfer on its
books is protected under the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers.
170. See supra notes 15-17.
171. Id.
172. Supra notes 23-28.
173. Supra notes 31-33.
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breach of trust." 174 What Professor Fratcher fails to indicate is whether this
knowledge is actual knowledge or constructive knowledge. If actual
knowledge, then Professor Fratcher's claim that the protective legislation does
not protect the innocent purchasers in King is correct. If, on the other hand,
the imposition of liability on the purchasers in the King case is based upon
negligent constructive knowledge, then the protective legislation's requirement
that the third party dealing with the trustee must have actual knowledge or bad
faith that the transaction constitutes breach of trust would accord the
purchasers in King protection against liability.
At common law, the generally accepted difference between actual
knowledge and constructive knowledge turned on whether the knowledge was
imputed to the party.' 75 If the party had first- hand conscious knowledge
of the matter, and the knowledge did not have to be imputed to the party, then
the knowledge was actual. If, on the other hand, the knowledge had to be
imputed to the party, the knowledge was constructive knowledge. In King, the
Fourth Circuit implicitly acknowledged that the defendants did not have actual
knowledge that the transaction constituted a breach of trust when it noted that
the fact that the purchasers "had no fraudulent intent and honestly believed
that they were acting lawfully does not affect the matter." 7 ' If the purchasers had actual knowledge that the transaction constituted a breach, there is no
way the purchasers could honestly believe they were acting lawfully. In
addition, Professor Fratcher himself implicitly admits that the purchasers of
the stock were held liable because they had constructiveknowledge, not actual
knowledge, that the transaction constituted a breach of trust:
[L]iability was imposed upon them under a theory that, in contemplation of
law, they knew the proposed use was a breach of trust. This theory
assumes, (1) because, in Common Law litigation, the meaning of the
language used in a written instrument is determined by the judge rather than
a jury, it is a matter of law; (2) all persons are bound to know the law and
treated as if they did know it; and (3) therefore, the chemical corporation
and the purchasers of the stock were liable as if they had known that the
trustees intended to divert the proceeds
of the sale to a purpose not
77
authorized by the terms of the trust.
Both the King opinion and Professor Fratcher implicitly acknowledge that the
knowledge that the transaction constituted a breach of trust was imputed to the

174. Fratcher, supra note 94, at 83 (emphasis added).
175. Supra note 17.
176. King v. Richardson, 136 F.2d 849, 859 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 777 (1943).
177. Fratcher, supra note 94, at 83 (emphasis added).
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purchasers of the stock, and as such constitutes constructive knowledge of the
breach of trust.
Having established that the purchaser's knowledge that the transaction
constituted a breach of trust was constructive knowledge, the question
becomes whether this constructive knowledge is negligent constructive
knowledge or bad faith constructive knowledge. 78 While negligent constructive knowledge of the breach of trust was sufficient to impose liability at
common law, negligent constructive knowledge is not enough under the
Uniform Commercial Code. 179 Under the protective legislation, the third
party takes free of the trust and free of liability to the trust beneficiaries absent
actual knowledge that the transaction constitutes a breach of trust or bad faith,
which in essence is bad faith constructive knowledge. The Fourth Circuit's
statement that the purchasers "had no fraudulent intent and honestly believed
that they were acting lawfully' 80 indicates that at most the purchasers were
guilty of negligent constructive knowledge, not bad faith constructive
knowledge, of the breach. Hence, the Uniform Commercial Code protects
innocent good faith purchasers, like the purchasers in the King case, who have
actual knowledge of the terms of the trust and in good faith believe the terms
authorize the transaction.' 8'
Assuming that Professor Fratcher advocates complete immunity for third
parties dealing with a trustee to maximize trust administration efficiency and
to protect innocent third parties who have actual knowledge of the terms of
the trust, the good faith and limited duty of inquiry standard protects such
third parties and ensures trust efficiency without protecting culpable third
parties who knowingly participate in a breach of trust or who in essence
knowingly participate by their bad faith.

178. Supra note 32.
179. Supra notes 32-33.
180. King, 136 F.2d at 859.
181. This conclusion is further supported by the case law which limits judicial

review of a trustee's interpretation of a trust instrument to the issue of whether the
trustee acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith. See Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d
1362, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). The trustee shall not be liable for
simple acts of negligence, but rather the trustee is liable only where the trustee's
conduct constitutes bad faith. If the trustee's negligent but good faith misinterpretation
of the trust provisions is protected under the good faith standard, certainly third parties
dealing with a trustee who misinterpret the trust provisions in good faith should be
protected under the good faith standard.
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V. CONCLUSION

Section seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act inexplicably provides
unusually broad protection to third parties dealing with a trustee. A thorough
examination of the legislative history behind section seven indicates that the
reason the unusually broad protection is inexplicable is that the unusually
broad protection was unintentional. The Special Committee responsible for
drafting section seven apparently believed that section seven tracked the

corresponding provisions of the other uniform laws addressing the liability of
third parties dealing with a trustee; the Special Committee apparently believed
that section seven contained the good faith and limited duty of inquiry

requirements.

This mistake apparently stems from the cryptic manner in

which the no duty of inquiry and actual knowledge standard was proposed.

There is no evidence that the Uniform Law Commission realized that section
seven provides unusually broad protection to third parties dealing with a

trustee.
Although in theory section seven provides unusually broad protection to
third parties dealing with a trustee, in practice section seven is ineffective.
The unusually broad protective provisions of section seven conflict with the
corresponding provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code. The vast majority of transactions covered by section seven
of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act are also covered by one or more of the
corresponding provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act or the Uniform
Commercial Code. Faced with the conflict between the governing standards,
and no clear legislative statement that the unusually broad actual knowledge
standard of section seven was intentional, third parties interested in dealing
with a trustee conform to the higher good faith and limited duty of inquiry
standard contained in the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. Accordingly, section seven creates needless confusion in the law
of trusts which quietly calls out for clarification. Any efforts at clarifying
section seven should begin with the presumption that the most logical standard
of liability for third parties dealing with a trustee is the traditional good faith
and limited duty of inquiry standard. The good faith and limited duty of
inquiry standard imposes minimal costs on trust administration, provides
adequate protection to third parties dealing with a trustee, and provides
consistency and uniformity within the uniform law system.
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